This special issue of the Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations is dedicated to scholarly contributions of PhD students who tackle topics of interest in current research in communication and media studies. This issue seeks to explore different views on the most debated topics and concepts in the European and world-wide academic research community. Whether we refer to the increasingly popular instruments of new media and social media and their role in offline activism, to media framing or to EU communication, the fields of communication and media studies lend themselves well to academic inquiry, as the contributions in this volume show.

Collectively, the articles of this issue reflect something of the breadth and diversity of research being undertaken within the field of communication and media studies in the last decade. This field has been in a profound process of transformation, triggered by new instruments, infrastructures and technologies, which have made redundant many of the traditional ways of tackling most of the topics questioned by researchers (Thussu, 2009). Until recently, media studies have overwhelmingly been produced by academics examining various aspects of the particular national media systems in their country of birth or residence. The explosion of transnational information flows, triggered by globalization, has shifted the traditional approach of studying the role of national media on informing national audiences and forming national public opinion to inquiries into transnational horizontal integration of media and communication structures, processes and audiences (Thussu, 2009). There is an acute need to promote research on a global level and to turn the focus on the specifics of Eastern emergent economies, such as India and China, in what regards media tools and their audiences. Nevertheless, the European regional level should not be left behind. There are significant changes happening in the communication and media structures inside the European continent, which is another rich field of constant academic attention. Readers will further find contributions which tackle the topics of European public sphere and the emergent European identity, as the most relevant concepts currently debated in the field of EU communication.

The debate on contemporary issues in communication and media studies takes a postmodernist view, which states that the present is the age when identities are determined by “whose
information is disseminated fastest” (Snipp-Walmsley in Kafle, 2009, p.14) and that mass media bring people closer by reducing boundaries of space and time. This is made possible by the multiple technologies, such as the Internet and different gadgets, which further create “more spaces and more possibilities of switching across them” (Kafle, 2009, p. 14). A lot of research has been dedicated to the impact of new media and, especially, social media on political communication and on social activism and citizens’ participation in the debate about solutions to common problems to be solved through public policies, both at national and transnational levels. In what regards online media, their interactivity is the most debated in current research. Scholars emphasize the role of online media feedback facilities on increasing the speed of the communication process: computer-based services such as e-mail, chat or discussion forums allow the audience to contact communicators quickly, easily and free of charge (Quiring & Schweiger, 2008). Moreover, they allow people to communicate with others interested in the same issues promoted through online media, fact that often triggers vivid online debates, in a “virtual public sphere” (Yuan, 2012).

Another interesting and well covered topic in new media research is the one of “online community”. According to Yuan (2012), much early research on this concept involved looking for the presence of key characteristics of community life in the online environment. Researchers have observed many manifestations of feelings of solidarity, empathy and support triggered by online interaction, which helped to legitimize the conception of online communication as a community (Yuan, 2012). However, as many researchers have recently noticed, a mismatch between empirical findings in online social interaction patterns and the characteristics of a community, current research goes in another direction. It looks into the impact of cultural or moral forces on the belief and behavior of the social actors engaging in sharing social resources, generating trust, and providing sociability online (Yuan, 2012).

One of the latest paradigm shifts in political-communication research consists in the emergent body of research on framing, agenda setting and priming (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). All three concepts refer to the literature of media effects. Agenda setting promotes that “there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). Priming refers to the fact that news content suggests to audiences to use specific issues as criteria for evaluating the performance of leaders, while framing is based on the assumption that how an issue is presented in news reports has an influence on how it is understood by audiences (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). There have been many scholarly contributions which have tried to tackle the differences and relationships between these three fundamental concepts in media effects. One of the promoted perspectives states that a main difference (on the psychological level) between “agenda setting and priming, on the one hand, and framing, on the other hand, is the one between whether we think about an issue and how we think about it” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 14, our emphasis). Another approach promotes the subsuming of all three concepts under the umbrella of agenda setting, as framing is a more refined version and priming – an extension of agenda setting. Building on these ideas, scholars have looked into these differences and relationships between agenda setting, priming and framing and have transformed this topic into a strong direction of research in media studies.

The first section of the current edition of the Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations addresses questions regarding the emergence of a European public sphere and a European identity. Investigating the European public sphere has proven to be a very challenging endeavour, both theoretically and empirically. The increasing of the literature produc-
tion invites researchers to explore many facets of the two still emerging concepts. So far, no consensus has been reached concerning a single unanimously accepted definition of the concepts, which results in vivid academic debates.

Scholars (Brüggemann, 2005; de Vreese, 2007) have argued that the development of the European public sphere can only take the form of the Europeanization of national public spheres. “In short, the European public sphere is home grown” (Jos de Beus, 2010, p. 32). The Europeanization of national public spheres focuses on the coverage of European issues and the actions of EU’s decision-makers in national public spheres and their evaluation from a European and not from a national perspective (Kunelius & Sparks, 2001; Kopper & Lepnik, 2006). Media play a fundamental role in such Europeanized national public spheres, as “according to the citizens themselves, their knowledge of the EU is derived largely from the mass media” (Kunelius & Sparks, 2001, p. 9). Therefore, it depends on the media and on the speakers if the European issues are commented from a national or a European perspective. Moreover, Fossum and Trenz (2006) emphasize that a Europeanized system of communication must not be confused with an increase of European messages in the national media. These messages are directed towards a national public who remains attached to the national communication customs and ways of framing the news. A fundamental approach in current research on the Europeanization of national public spheres is that of Michael Brüggemann and Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw (2009). The two scholars understand Europeanization as a structural transformation of national public debates, as a process with two dimensions: vertical (a high attention dedicated to EU and to European policies in national public spheres) and horizontal (the attention directed towards other member states in what regards events, actors, actions, decisions or statements). Combinations of these two dimensions result in: a) comprehensive Europeanization; b) segmented Europeanization; c) Europeanization aloof from the EU and d) a parochial public sphere.

The issue of a common identity that would bind together the citizens of the member states has been one of the major challenges of the EU and, in our opinion, it should remain one of the priorities of EU leaders. We claim that the European debt crisis shouldn’t outweigh the relevance of the identity and solidarity crises within the EU, which, in fact, the debt crisis itself revealed. Creating and consolidating a strong European identity is compulsory, as Eriksson (2007, p. 24) emphasizes: „a collective identity above the level of primary groups and a collective we-feeling are needed in order for the EU citizens to acknowledge the sacrifices imposed in the name of the European collective goods”.

Scholars (Burgess, 2002; Risse, 2003; Bruter, 2004) have reached a consensus on the irrelevance of understanding national and European identities in zero-sum terms: citizens of member states may feel both German, British or Greek and European (belonging to the EU) without finding these identities contradictory. Moreover, not all the multiple collective identities of a person are salient at the same time. Therefore, in different situations, European citizens might relate either to their European or to their national identities. Although the literature now finds the zero-sum perspective of national and European identities irrelevant, strong national identities might be detrimental to the consolidation of a European identity when related to the “I-Other” dialectic. If the national identity is strong, one may see another European citizen, of another member state, as the “other”. We should bear in mind these theoretical aspects, as we will tackle them later in this introductory study.

The current national cleavages and divergent interests of member states have made the project of the salvation of the Eurozone outshine the project of an “ever closer Union”. Similar-
ly, political decisions seem to outweigh the communication strategies which were a priority in 2007. In this context, one might ask: what relevance does the EU political communication have when the future of the EU is itself under question? Are former objectives such as increasing EU’s visibility and support among citizens or building a European public sphere still relevant? We consider that there are strong arguments which can be brought in defense of continuing this debate, arguments which tend to be overlooked.

2013 finds the EU at the crossroads, struggling between integration and fragmentation, with not much consensus when faced with Tsoukalis’ question: “what kind of Europe?” (2003/2005). A recent report issued by the National Intelligence Council (*Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, 2012, pp. 78-79) forecasts three scenarios for Europe and its international role in 2030: Collapse, Slow Decline or Renaissance. We argue that the projects of a European public sphere and a European identity play a significant role in EU’s choice for a rise or fall. In a Slow Decline scenario, the EU would manage to exit the crisis, but without undertaking the necessary structural reforms. This would result in long-term low economic growth, high public discontent, a decrease in Europe’s international presence and a re-nationalization of members’ foreign policies (*Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, 2012, pp. 78-79). Taking into consideration not only that such a prospect would defeat the purpose of EU’s existence as a prosperous international player, but also that it could deepen the tensions between member states, this scenario should be avoided. As we consider the collapse to be unlikely, this makes the Renaissance scenario the only desirable one. It implies a “federalist leap” supported by the European citizens and would lead to a more united foreign and security policy, an enhanced European democracy and an increased role of the EU on the world stage (*Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, 2012, pp. 78-79). Therefore, this scenario might actually bring to light a stronger EU, once the current crisis would be overcome.

Scholars warn about the effects that EU’s latest decisions might have on public opinion. Martinico and Cantore (2012) question the consequences of EU’s struggle with its own constitutional limits, manifested through its interventions in the Greek and Italian politics, on EU’s perceived legitimacy. Hans Kundnani’s answer is that, as a result of the crisis, EU has shifted from a “Europe of incentives” to a Europe of punishment and coercion (*What kind of Europe?*, November 13, 2012). Instead of being associated with the benefits of membership, such as the freedom to study, travel and work in any member state, the EU risks being perceived as a “joyless union of penalties, punishments, disciplines and seething resentments” (*As the dust settles, a cold new Europe with Germany in charge will emerge*, December 9, 2011). In the context of a constant increase of Euro-skepticism at the level of public opinion (*Standard Eurobarometer 77*, Spring 2012), asking for Europeans’ support for more integration might become a difficult project. Based on the existing literature, presented in several articles of this current edition, we argue that a European public sphere and an emergent European identity are crucial for citizens’ adhesion to a Renaissance Europe’s goals.

The plea for more integration as a solution for EU’s Renaissance does not oppose the current context. On the one hand, the recently ratified Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, even though an intergovernmental agreement by nature, aims to deepen EU integration. Scholars (Mac Amhlaigh, 2011; Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012; Martinico & Cantore, 2012) support this view, arguing that enhanced cooperation does not imply an alteration of EU’s supranational character, but a push for a more integrated economic governance. The member states are continuously considering ways to co-ordinate their fiscal policies in order to avoid a repeat of the bail-outs of 2010–2012.
These policies do not detach the nation from the EU, they bind the member states more closely together (Fligstein et al., 2012). On the other hand, a more federal, Renaissant Europe is considered to be consistent with a multi-speed perspective, allowing member states to opt out or to adopt a wait-and-see policy (Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, 2012, p. 79). This scenario might respond to the demands of Euro-skeptical member states such as the United Kingdom who asks for “exceptionalism” (EU patience running out as Britain struggles to settle its European destiny, December 27, 2012) or the Czech Republic, who started pleading for a more “flexible integration” (Jan Fischer: What is the future of the EU?, October 13, 2012).

The UNDP Human Development Report for 2011 concluded that the “business-as-usual” of the world is “neither equitable nor sustainable”, placing income inequality as one of the biggest problems of the world. This indicator has deteriorated in most countries and regions and “the gap between the rich and the poor widened over the last two decades in more than three-quarters of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries and in many emerging market economies” (Human Development Report, 2011, p. 29). Average country-level income inequality increased over 1990–2005 around 20%, the worst deterioration being in Europe and Central Asia – more than 100% (Human Development Report, 2011). At the European level, the concern for growing disparities is shared by the Institute for Analysis, Strategy and Prognosis “GeoPOL” (GeoPOL Report – EU’s Fiscal Treaty, 2012), who considers the Fiscal Compact a first step towards a “Europe of inequality”, where the cleavages between centre and periphery are deepened. The report argues that the crisis has divided the Eurozone in two camps: a prosperous, cautious North which calls for austerity and an economically unbalanced, over-indebted South that calls for solidarity (GeoPOL Report – EU’s Fiscal Treaty, 2012, p. 2). This “European Clash of Civilisations” was foreseen by the European Council on Foreign Relations since 2011 (Ten trends for 2012, December 21, 2011), being explained with references to Huntington’s famous thesis: “Although the real cause of the crisis is the structural flaw of designing a single currency without a common treasury, Northern Europeans have tended to explain the euro’s problems as a clash between a fiscally-responsible north and an irresponsible south. Southern countries, on the other hand, feel betrayed by what they see as the limited and conditional solidarity of the north – which they see as part of the problem. They feel they have contributed to Germany’s success during the last decade by buying German exports such as cars. France, meanwhile, is caught in the middle – the equivalent of what Huntington called a ‘torn country’ (like Turkey in the conflict between the West and Islam). It wants to be part of the north – which is where power is shifting – but finds itself in danger of becoming part of the south. These views actually reveal that national identity is reinforced when any of its components is threatened or if some nations are thought to benefit more from the EU (more resources, for example) than others (Hix, 1998). This happens because people who highly identify with a group are “willing to work for the group and promote action when things get badly” (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje & Manstead, 2003, p. 569). Therefore, in times of crisis for the EU, European citizens promote action in favor of their countries and relate to their national identity, not to their European one.

This brings into question the concept of solidarity. Both European and national voices have launched calls for solidarity once the crisis has deepened. But how can solidarity be achieved and how can member states come to a common understanding of what it means in the context of growing disparities and tensions between them? We believe that only through an Europeanization of national public spheres and the actualization of citizens’ European
identity can solidarity be assumed by Europeans. As Bârgăoanu and Negrea (2011) argue, this solidarity is not only an economical or geographical problem, but also a communication project. It is associated with a consciousness of belonging to a United Europe, as a result of common, shared experiences among European people.

Habermas’ (2001) warning that the loss of solidarity can lead to political fragmentation seems very actual in the current context, with Catalonia’s call for independence and the tensions in the Eurozone. In his view, the solution to prevent this fragmentation from happening and in order to ensure a democratic supranational political environment, a cosmopolitan solidarity is needed, one defined as “a global sense of shared responsibility and shared commitments to inclusion and participation” (Pensky, 2001, p. xiv). Barroso’s statement (Father of Europe contemplates his broken family, February 8, 2012) that “the cost of an eventual Greek default would be much higher than the cost of helping Greece” gives a measure of what Habermas calls a “consciousness of a compulsory cosmopolitan solidarity” (2001, p. 112), though in a roughly instrumental way. If EU’s incentives for solidarity fail in times of crisis making way for resentments between countries, a “stick” approach, based on a pragmatic problem-solving community perspective seems more viable.

The key for solidarity might just consist in framing the national problems of certain Eurozone members as common to all EU members, because of their potential consequences; in other words, in making the “common European good” a national interest. Media, both national and pan-European, would play a central role in building and disseminating this message. Solidarity needs to be redefined and adapted to the current challenges. Our argument is that this goal can only be achieved with the Europeanization of national public spheres and the actualization of European identity. We share Risse’s view (2010, p. 121) that a transnational community of communication requires that speakers in different public spheres recognize each other as legitimate participants in the debate. Furthermore, we see this condition as fundamental for solidarity to emerge, “even among strangers” (Habermas, 2001, p. 73). An Europeanization of public spheres would imply not only an increased visibility of the EU (vertical Europeanization), but also an increased awareness of citizens in regard to the problems and different perceptions of other member states (horizontal Europeanization). No horizontal or vertical Europeanization, which results in the parochiality of the media, can only broaden the cleavages between countries, especially between the North and the South. It consolidates a unidirectional view of the “reality” of the crisis, one centered on national interests and on the tendency to blame “the other” member states. This view negatively impacts the European “we”, taking into consideration that the other member states are seen as the out-group. In contrast, a Europeanized media which would give visibility to the plurality of voices in the debate, framing the crisis as a “common, European, problem” might be the answer to the above question regarding the possibility of solidarity to emerge and its understanding in the current context. Without doubt, the crisis is a test for members’ commitment to the EU, “for better or for worse”, in prosperity and in crisis. Moreover, the European debt crisis made the EU more visible to European citizens and the debates about its future have become more intense than ever. This fact gives opportunity for interesting and insightful research on the European public sphere and European identity.

Drawing on data from interviews conducted with Romanian Erasmus students who have taken part in exchange programmes in Belgium, Germany and Italy, Georgiana Udrea presents a comprehensive study of the manifestations of European identity, building on a constructionist perspective. The paper confirms the existence of multiple identities which do not
exclude each other, but coexist, being actualized in different degrees and different contexts. The author identifies several layers of Romanian Erasmus students’ identity while in an intercultural environment. Not surprisingly, national identity is the strongest, but it proves not to be incompatible with European identity, as some theories would suggest. The research shows that Romanian students have experienced both civic and cultural components of European identity, either referring to the advantages brought by EU membership, such as free movement, or to a sense of belonging to a common European culture, highlighted by the interactions with students from other continents. Other layers of identity revealed by the study are group identity – the feeling of being part of the Erasmus community – and, less frequently, regional identity, either at the national level, or as an identification with Eastern Europe. The paper concludes that Romanian Erasmus students who studied in Europe actualized these different layers of identity in accordance with the various situations they encountered, some layers being more salient than others.

By conducting a content analysis on two online news portals in Romania – www.hotnews.ro and www.ziare.com – for the March–June 2012 time frame, Roxana Dascălu argues that instrumental European identity, defined as the identity based on self-interest calculation, is a reality. The European Union has been experimenting new ways to contribute to the emergence of a European identity, trying to promote to its citizens symbols as identity markers once used by nations with the same aim (such as a flag, an anthem, a currency) and using specific frames. In the EU context, funding opportunities are also being used to foster European identity acquisition. The research shows that the appearance of frames promoting the gains citizens have as a result of their country getting EU funds is quite high. Articles frame as a positive fact that EU offers Romania great amounts of money to be spent. Although unconsciously used, this frame helps to speed the active significant role that instrumental factors play in defining and strengthening individuals’ sense of identification with the EU. As results show, journalists frame the situation in favor of the EU, which gives free money to European citizens – in these case Romanians – and Romania is not able to spend it properly, due to cases of corruption, discrimination, incompetence, lack of money for co-funding the projects, among others. An interesting aspect revealed is that, when it comes to the implementation and management of EU funds, Romanian citizens tend to sanction Romanian institutions and relate to the EU in a positive manner, thus similar to the journalists’ views. Therefore, Romanians believe EU delivers important economic benefits to their communities and to their country. Roxana Dascălu considers this to be both a necessary condition for the emergence of an instrumental European identity and an instance of this concept in real life circumstances.

Laura Paraschiv and Monica Gherghel propose a conceptual inquiry into the multiple deficits of the European Union. Building on the existing literature, they argue that the use of national media can represent the key factor in solving EU’s communication, democratic and legitimacy issues. The authors plead for a three-step model which starts with the communication deficit of the EU, potentially surpassed once the national public spheres become Europeanized with the help of domestic media. The development of a European public sphere through Europeanization would make way for debate, transparency and awareness of citizens regarding EU affairs, reducing the democratic deficit of the EU. Subsequently, the European public sphere could set the ground for the emergence of a European identity, consolidating citizen’s feeling of belonging to a European community, which in turn would increase the legitimacy of the European project. According to the authors, media play a central, two-faceted role in this process, both in increasing EU’s visibility, presence and impor-
tance in people’s lives, and in shaping their attitude and support. The authors draw attention on studies which showed the effect of valenced news framing on public opinion, arguing that media should pay attention to its role in either reducing or fuelling Euroscepticism, which is a symptom of EU’s deficits.

Adina Marincă’s paper tests the concept of Romanian citizens’ participation in the public sphere, generated by the signing of the European Fiscal Compact. Political claims analysis and frames analysis were applied on readers’ comments to the articles published by two Romanian newspapers – Adevărul and Evenimentul Zilei, during January and May 2012 regarding this topic. The analysis reveals that the degree of Europeanization of the newspaper influences the degree of Europeanization of readers’ debate, and has opposite tendencies for the two newspapers. The same conclusion holds for readers’ attitudes, in relation to the overall position adopted by the newspapers. However, what is common for both Adevărul and EVZ readers is the division of their attitudes along political affinities. While supporters of the Democrat-Liberal Party and of the President proved to be in favour of the fiscal treaty, the opposing camp was highly critical of the decision to join the intergovernmental agreement. In addition, disregard of their perception of the Fiscal Compact, the two opposite sides have in common an overall critical attitude towards the Romanian political class. Although they partly adopt some of the frames formerly identified in the statements of both Romanian and European political leaders, readers tend to put a different spin on them or to prioritize them in different ways. Their debate is highly politicized, often highly emotional as well, drawing on multiple, often valenced interpretations. The paper concludes that, despite the variety of opinions, they all point to the desire for cautiousness in the given economic context.

The second section of the current issue of the Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations presents articles which tackle other topics currently under vibrant debate in communication and media studies, such as: the role of framing in defining “soft” or “hard” news, the impact of social media in offline activism, the updated debate on Hirschman’s model of voice, exit and loyalty or the role of travel blogs in promoting the brand of a travel destination. In their second contribution to the volume, Monica Gherghel and Laura Paraschiv present the current scholarly debate regarding the role of framing in placing a news item into the “soft” or “hard” news categories. As there is no consensus in the literature on the definition of “soft” and “hard” news, the authors argue that both the topic of a news item and the way the topic is framed may help keeping the “soft” and “hard” news dichotomy actual and increase its usefulness in media studies. Moreover, the authors critically present the two directions identified in the literature regarding the discussed dichotomy and framing. On one hand, scholars promote a direction which goes from hard/soft news to framing, focused on the frames used in media coverage. On the other hand, the literature reveals a direction that goes from framing to hard/soft news, which is less discussed. Monica Gherghel and Laura Paraschiv plead for the relevance of the latter to the current research in the field. This approach relies on the fact that some aspects of an issue or an event may be given more salience by the way it is framed (although this cannot be generalized), thus framing contributes to the decision of introducing a news item in the “soft” or “hard” category. Therefore, it would be misleading to predetermine a news item as “hard” or “soft” and without taking into consideration its framing strategy. Moreover, the authors claim that there is a higher probability that a news item with a hard topic falls into the soft category through framing than vice versa.

Dragoș Lucian Ivan argues that empirical research recommends a moderation of the initial scholarly enthusiasm regarding the capacity of social media to trigger youth political en-
engagement. He conducted an extensive qualitative investigation of the University Square Protest in Bucharest, using focus-groups, in-depth interviews and surveys. The protest started on January 12, 2012, as a result of Raed Arafat’s resignation, and consisted in both physical and online manifestations. The author draws a typology of the protest participants, studying the different use of the social media by the identified categories. The results show a clear division between two groups: the exclusively online activists, who do not take part in the physical protest, and the offline activists, who use social media only as a secondary communication tool. The study reveals the attitudes adopted by each group, their different perceptions of what political change means and how it can be achieved, but also the interactions between them, marked by growing tensions. While the online activists perceive their use of social media such as Facebook or Twitter as meaningful and sufficient political engagement and a form of solidarity with the offline activists, the latter manifest a feeling of rejection towards the former. For the offline protesters, solidarity takes up a different, stronger meaning, which involves the physical presence at the University Square Protest, thus blaming the online group for non-participation. This explains why, in contrast to the online group, they seemed to develop an emerging group identity and confessed that the protest brought them new acquaintances, whom they subsequently referred to as friends. On the other hand, the online participants’ motivation turned out to revolve around improving their self- or online image. The paper concludes that social media did not play a role by themselves as catalysts of Romanian youth engagement, but rather that it was used as an auxiliary tool in support of the physical protests, which were perceived to be the dominant form of political participation. However, it is important to note that the two groups showed a very different perception about what civic activism is, acting accordingly.

Horia Moașă proposes an endeavor consisting in a two-fold critique of Hirschman’s model of voice, exit and loyalty, building on a comprehensive literature review of current organization studies. The author argues that the model leaves out the fundamental concept of silence when considering the decisions which the employees have to make when their situation in the organization severely deteriorates: to voice discontent or to exit the organization. Thus, employees have another option, besides showing their dissatisfaction, when facing the deterioration of the organization: to accept the changes and adapt to them. Moreover, Horia Moașă claims that voice and salience may actually go together with the decisions of remaining in or leaving the organization: an employee may choose to either exit the organization in silence or to voice his/her dissatisfaction; if an employee chooses to be loyal to the organization and to continue to work for it, he/she can do it both by complaining or by silently accepting the changes the organization goes through. The author also relates the voice and exit options with the concept of identity. Both voice and exit impact employees’ identity, as leaving the organization entails renouncing to share its beliefs, values and interests, while remaining inside the deteriorating organization triggers adaptation to or fighting against the changes in the organizational culture.

In the last contribution to the volume, Raluca Tudor presents a study of travel blogs with Romanian and French authors about touristic points of interest in Romania, revealing their significance in the promotion of Romania’s image as a travel destination. These blogs are among the most trusted sources of information regarding travel destinations, after family and friends. The author claims that this comparative study brings data to tourism marketers, useful in elaborating communication strategies for consumers who use this type of information source when making decisions regarding travelling. The results show that while the French
travel blogs consist in records of personal experience, Romanian travel blogs are comprehensive online study guides written by the traveller who has personally seen and evaluated the described destinations.

References


