

Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations

Revista română de Comunicare și Relații Publice

Volume 15, no. 2 (29) / July 2013

New Media and Democracy

Editors:

Tudor Vlad

Lee B. Becker

The Internet, the crisis of the written press and why
should we care

European IPTV and the digital divide

Different types of conflict in the news and their
impact on political trust: the cumulated effect of
incivility and intrusiveness

ROMANIAN JOURNAL OF
COMMUNICATION
AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

Volume 15, no. 2 (29) / July 2013

Scientific Committee

- Delia BALABAN (Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)
- Alina BĂRGĂOANU (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)
- Camelia BECIU (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)
- Lee B. BECKER (University of Georgia, US)
- Felix BEHLING (University of Essex, UK)
- Hanoch BEN-YAMI (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary)
- Diana CISMARU (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)
- Nicoleta CORBU (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)
- Alina HALILIUC (Denison University, US)
- Kathy HAUGHT (Rider University, US)
- Dragoş ILIESCU (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania; TestCentral)
- Loredana IVAN (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)
- Adrian LESENCIUC (Air Force Academy “Henri Coanda”, Brasov, Romania)
- Mira MOSHE (Ariel University Center of Samaria, Israel)
- Sorin NASTASIA (Southern Illinois University, US)
- Nicolas PELISSIER (University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France)
- Dana POPESCU-JOURDY (University of Lyon 2, France)
- Remus PRICOPIE (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)
- Dan STĂNESCU (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)
- Panayiota TSATSOU (Swansea University, UK)
- Anca VELICU (Institute of Sociology, Romanian Academy)
- Tudor VLAD (University of Georgia, US)
- David WEBERMAN (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary)
- Alexandra ZBUCHEA (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania)

Editorial Board

Paul Dobrescu (editor in chief)

Elena Negrea-Busuioac (editor)

Cristian Lupeanu (layout)

Editor

College of Communication and Public Relations – NUPSPA

6 Povernei St., Sector 1, Bucharest

Tel.: 201 318 0889; Fax: 021 318 0882

elena.negrea@comunicare.ro; www.journalofcommunication.ro

The Journal is published three times a year. The journal has been indexed by ProQuest CSA, EBSCO Publishing, CEEOL, DOAJ, Cabell's Directory, Index Copernicus and Genamics Journal Seek. This journal is recognized by CNCIS and included in the B+ category (www.cncis.ro).

The titles of the articles have been translated into Romanian by the publisher.

ISSN 1454-8100

Contents

New Media and Democracy

Tudor VLAD, Lee B. BECKER

New Media and Democracy. Introductory Remarks / 9

Nicolae URS

The Internet, the Crisis of the Written Press and Why Should We Care / 11

Mira MOSHE

European IPTV and the digital divide / 33

Mădălina BOȚAN

*Different types of conflict in the news and their impact on political trust:
the cumulated effect of incivility and intrusiveness* / 49

Varia

Alina MIHALCEA, Rodica SĂVULESCU, Alexandra VIȚELAR

Generation Y: between a civic and a cultural European identity / 61

Book review

Elena NEGREA-BUSUIOC

Review of *The Walk of Shame* edited by Mira Moshe and Nicoleta Corbu. New York:
Nova Science Publishers, 2013, 265 pages / 79

Call for papers / 83

Sumar

Noile media și democrația

Tudor VLAD, Lee B. BECKER

Noile media și democrația. Introducere / 9

Nicolae URS

Internetul și criza presei scrise / 11

Mira MOSHE

IPTV în Europa și decalajul digital / 33

Mădălina BOȚAN

Tipuri de conflicte diferite în știri și impactul lor asupra încrederii politice: efectul cumulat al nepolitetei și al indiscreției / 49

Varia

Alina MIHALCEA, Rodica SĂVULESCU, Alexandra VIȚELAR

Generația Y: între o identitate Europeană civică și una culturală / 61

Recenzie

Elena NEGREA-BUSUIOC

Recenzia cărții *The Walk of Shame*, coord. Mira Moshe și Nicoleta Corbu. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2013, 265 pagini / 79

Call for papers / 83

New Media and Democracy

Tudor VLAD*
Lee B. BECKER**

New Media and Democracy. Introductory Remarks

Researchers have argued that a true democracy cannot function without freedoms of association, information, and communication. While in the Western countries the consolidation of these characteristics of the society occurred during a long period of time, in the post-communist space the process has been much more compressed. These countries have moved toward democracy in starts and stops, sometimes with regression. The Arab Spring has shown how complex and sometimes dangerous this transition can be and how a successful path in one region might not be an effective model for other parts of the world.

Political science literature suggests that a country becomes a stable democracy by going through four phases. These four stages of societal development have been labeled pretransition, transition, consolidation and stable (or mature). The pretransition stage focuses on societal conditions before the fall of the old regime, while the transition is that moment when the previous regime loses its political power. A state becomes consolidated when the ideals of democracy are understood and embraced, and then it is entirely stable when democracy functions over a longer period of time.

Media experts have emphasized the role of mass media in a democratic society. They have argued that media that are free of interference from government, business or dominant social groups have the ability to support the competitive and participatory elements that define democracy. Free and independent media foster the societal objectives of democracy, a healthy economic system, more cultural dialog and general human development. They also provide citizens with a public forum where they can express their opinions, beliefs and viewpoints to others. The media in a democracy informs, entertains and enriches the life through the profusion of others' ideas, opinions and visions, and it properly informs so that meaningful decisions are made by the public and by the governments. The media provide for an expression of options so meaningful decisions can be made.

An overview of the media evolution in East and Central Europe suggests that media tend to be most supportive of democracy in the early, often euphoric, period after the previous regime has fallen, when journalists, as well as other citizens, are enjoying their newfound freedoms. As the transition process moves toward consolidation, the media as well as the public can become more cynical, particularly in the face of continued political wrangling and the financial pressures of a market economy. While government censorship or influence tend to decrease across time in the democratic consolidation phase, other types of pressure be-

* James M. Cox Jr. Center for International Mass Communication Training and Research, University of Georgia, tvlad@uga.edu.

** James M. Cox Jr. Center for International Mass Communication Training and Research, University of Georgia, lbbecker@uga.edu.

come equal or more powerful, such as those coming from political and economic groups. In some countries, a process of partial remonopolization of the media has been noticeable, and the ownership of some of these media groups has not been transparent. The hypercompetition in media markets in some emerging democracies (defined as too many media outlets in relatively weak economies) has led to low professionalism of journalists, biased coverage, sensationalism and, as a result, low credibility and a decline in audience appeal.

The new communication technologies and the new media have added more complexity to this already complicated landscape. They have dramatically changed the relationship between those who generate news content and those who have access to and benefit from that content. A huge volume of material is currently produced by non-traditional communicators. The public can better control what and when to read or watch different types of content. Communication has ceased to be unidirectional, as many new media allow and encourage feedback, and many consumers have also become producers. Portable storage devices and other technologies have transformed consumers into programmers. One can say that mass communication in the last thirty years has gone through a process of democratization.

The new technologies and new media have challenged the traditional media, creating a new type of competition for audience attention, for advertising revenue and for content. The established media have lost their exclusive access to the distribution of the information and their exclusive access to content.

Bloggers, citizen or community journalists don't have to observe the professional norms and organizational strategies that journalists working for established media follow. These new communicators can express opinion, can be partizan, and can merge the status of an information provider with the status of an advocate.. They can focus on a small community or on specific issues that are not covered by the mainstream media. They can produce debates that are of interest for a narrow group of readers or viewers. As long as these alternative sources of information generate a better informed citizenry, it is a gain for a democratic society.

This revolution in the mass communication landscape has given more power to, but also has created more challenges for, the members of the audiences. Consumers have a vast range of news sources, and making the right option is not always easy. At the same time, the use of social media stimulates a new type of writing and reading that is based on a more limited investment of time and attention. The news consumers in the future might become unable to watch, read or process more complex pieces of information.

One can argue that information distributed via the traditional newspapers, television and radio station still has the advantage of the institutional credibility that the organizations and institutions possess. Even consolidated democracies, however, the economic crisis has affected financially the mainstream media newsrooms. Many journalists have lost their jobs and, as a result, the quality of the coverage has suffered. In authoritarian regimes or in emerging democracies, people often distrusted the established media in the past, and that bias against them continues today. In those cases, social media often become the major source of information during a crisis situation. The Arab Spring and the situation in authoritarian regimes have shown that authorities in those states are suspicious of new and social media and perceive them as a potential danger.

The impact of the new media in emerging and consolidated democracies is a fascinating topic of conversation and area of scholarship. The relationship between the media and political and institutions in society is dynamic. The changes now taking place have altered in an unprecedented way the mass communication landscape and demand that scholars develop new theoretical perspectives to analyze and understand. This volume responds to that demand.

Nicolae URS*

The Internet, the Crisis of the Written Press and Why Should We Care

Abstract

The internet has changed the way people find data. Connected 24/7 to the internet through their mobile phones and tablet computers, this new form of communication is influencing all those that earn their pay-check working with information. It seems that no other area is as affected as journalism in general and, in particular, the printed press. A combination of newspaper's mistakes, technological advances and shifting consumer habits push the once king of the media to the brink of extinction. Media executives around the world are trying to put together a new economic model for the venerable newspaper. Even if they succeed, the media landscape is changed forever.

Keywords: Newspapers; printed press crisis; internet; online journalism.

Going from an industrial to an information society has fundamentally altered the way in which information reaches people. The newspaper was the perfect instrument to deliver information to a large number of readers in a reasonable amount of time. It appeared together with the industrial revolution and it borrowed from the attributes of mass production: its content was preset (the same for everybody), it was multiplied in a huge number of copies which were delivered via a complex distribution network throughout a state like area. This type of creation and distribution of the newspaper (the only one available in that period) has led to several of the „unchangeable” rules of journalism (like deadlines or the need to fit texts in a limited amount of space). These rules established hundreds of years ago, are still followed by the printed press because, essentially, nothing has changed in the way information is wrapped and delivered to the readers since 200 years ago. The product (article, newspaper) had to be finished in order to be printed and dispatched.

Radio and Television have taken on mostly the same pattern, dreaded deadline and all, because they are also one directional channels of information transmission, almost never interactive. In the end, a report needs to be finalized before it is aired.

The internet is the first information outlet, following the ancient Greek Agora, which profits off of interactivity. One of the main characteristic of Internet – the fact that it's online, that it's available at all times, that it's always connected – makes the deadline obsolete. The pressure of first publication increases enormously. What this means is that the new disseminators of information (bloggers especially) do not consider their articles finished, and journalism (if we can agree that at least a part of blogs are media) becomes a process which does not deliver a finished good but engages a debate. The process is in this case is the product that bloggers publish, and this process is improved by the contributions of those who participate in the

* FSPAC, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, urs@fspac.ro.

debate. In this case the one writing the article supplies the contextual information, the available data and explains what is unknown, by relying on the contributions of the community in order to improve the material. The easiness with which, we can update and complete an article, online, is essential in order for this system to work. Printed newspapers do not have this luxury; once the article is printed it cannot be altered (unless we are in the dystopia society that George Orwell imagined in the novel *1984*).

We may say that traditional journalists see their product as finished while a lot of online bloggers and journalists consider their materials in a perpetually *beta* state. One problem of this transformation is that for thousands of years people have been engaged in seeing a newspaper article as the final version. This habit is applied to articles appeared in online papers or blogs. Kicking that habit will take time.

The arrival of the printed newspaper led to institutionalizing distribution, for it was expensive. Press institutions built a capital of trust, which was different from their main means of achieving and maintaining audience. Once distribution was almost free of charge, because of the internet, a new model of journalism appears, the cooperative one, where trust could be placed not only in an institution, like the New York Times), but in the process that allowed the information to be published and verified. There is no blog that can compete against the New York Times, but a group of blogs together with a list of people on Twitter, can do so.

1. The Death of Newspapers

It seems like the written press was always destined to doom. James Gordon Bennet, founder of the *New York Herald*, stated in 1850 that “newspapers must face their destiny and disappear” (Shannon, 2003, p. vii). This strong affirmation was made under the influence of the telegraph – seen at the time as the next big thing in terms of means of mass communication.

Several times, along the four hundred years’ life span of the written press, have there been predictions about its doom. First there was the telegraph, then the radio, then movie theater news bulletins, after which came television with the appealing moving images that we could watch from the comfort of our own homes.

Once the radio emerged as a means of mass communication, and furthermore, once the US stock market crashed in 1929, the US written press faced a significant (45%) decrease in advertising incomes between 1929 and 1933. Hundreds of newspapers went bankrupt and about a third of all journalists lost their jobs (Emery & Emery, 1978).

Last on the black list of the written press is the internet, and it seems that it is the greatest threat it has had to face so far.

Printed newspapers went through very little change in the last century. If we look at the pages of a newspaper printed in early 20th century, and compare them to those of a recently dated paper, we will find only small differences: a less overwhelming design, and more colorful pictures. As for the content, and the journalistic genres – they are the same as 100 years ago. This is a comforting stability, on the one hand, as a large part of their audience relies on such stability. However, if we take into consideration the latest technical developments, we may wonder whether the written press has not missed some opportunities to transform and to turn the information revolution to its advantage.

In the western countries, the number of issues sold per capita has been constantly decreasing for decades. In France, the sales peak was the year 1950, in Great Britain it was 1957, in

the United States it was 1971, and in Japan it was 1981 (Dunnett, 1988, p. 2). In 2009, for the first time since we have had official data, the number of issues sold globally was dropping. In 2010, the numbers went down even faster (McAthy, 2011). This means that, for the first time, the increasing number of issues sold in developing countries (like China, India, or Latin America) did not cover the decreasing sales in the developed countries (North America, Europe, Australia, and Japan).

Therefore, the written press appears to be in a state of decline out of which we can foresee no exit. Still, this crisis is not generated by a lower audience. The number of printed issues sold is indeed decreasing, but the number of people who read the online editions of the same newspapers is increasing. For instance, in the United States, there was a 4.6% decrease in 2009 in number of written issues sold, but a 16% increase of web viewers the related pages (US Congress Hearing [1], 2010).

2. The Falling Number of Journalists

Increased audience does not seem enough to stop – at least in the Western World – the bleeding out of reporters, photographers, and editors who are losing their jobs. According to *PaperCuts.com*, designed to track the evolution of newspaper layoffs in the US written press, between 2007 and 2012, 204 newspapers were closed down and 19 gave up printing issues and turned into online publications. Starting with the same year, 2007, the number of journalists who lost their jobs in the US got to at least 41,344 in August 2012. The number of reporters and editors (people who write the articles, do the field work, and check the truthfulness of information) dropped from 56,900 in 1990 to 40,600 in April 2012 – a decrease of over 28% (Mutter, 2012).

Things look the same in Romania. According to Cristian Godinac, the president of the *MediaSind* Romanian Federation of Journalists, some 6,000 (out of 22,000) journalists lost their jobs (Ștefan, 2011) between 2008 and 2011.

The lower number of journalists is just one side of the story. Those left must now produce more articles, and every one of them must not only cover more stories, but also shape them in different ways, for the digital issues of the papers. In 1999, the Wall Street Journal produced an average of 22,000 articles a year. In 2009, the number had grown to over 40,000, while the number of journalists had dropped down by 13% (Starkman, 2010). The increase in the number of written pieces was also acknowledged by a study conducted on Great Britain's dailies (Lewis, Williams, Franklin, Thomas & Mosdell, 2008) – which stopped at 2006. Besides having to fill the pages of newspapers with articles, journalists are often also responsible for the online editions and the *facebook* and *twitter* updates. Essentially, journalists work on more articles at the same time than they did 5 or 10 years ago. This could easily translate to a more superficial approach on any story, to articles that rely more and more on press releases of different government agencies or private companies, and largely on other articles taken, with slight adjustments, from press agency feeds (Johnson, 2012). When we read an article in our favorite newspaper, even if we are not very familiar with the topic, we usually trust that the journalists did their research well. If we master the topic, and the piece is riddled with gruesome mistakes, our confidence level in that journalist and newspaper suffers a serious blow. Still, we must also bear in mind – not as an excuse, but as mitigating circumstances – that journalists are faced with an overwhelming workload.

Personnel cuts are often done to the disadvantage of the body of editors. In trying to keep as many reporters on the field as possible, newspapers first fire those whose daily tasks are less visible. A study (Stepp, 2009) published in *American Journalism Review* shows that the number of people who check an article in printed editions is decreasing. As for the online editions, journalists often post the articles themselves, along with pictures that they themselves have often taken. This means that articles are published faster, but that their quality (i.e. the manner of writing, the number of mistakes, the value and visibility of their titles – the widest read part of every article) is lower.

3. The Ruin of the Editorial Model, and the Social Role of Newspapers

Another side effect of online news development is the so-called *unbundling*, meaning the division of stories that were once published together in a newspaper. A printed newspaper is a whole. The stories tackled in its pages are not of equal interest for its readers. More often than not, the sports news, the weather forecasts, and the celebrity news are more popular than social news or investigations. However, as they cannot be purchased individually, the articles with a higher number of readers basically “pay for” the less popular ones, which are deemed important by the news editors – long and complex investigations, foreign correspondence, the patient and persistent tracking of administrative actions. In this way, newspapers would fulfill their social role – acknowledged by the legislation of all democratic countries. This counter-intuitive model in which sports news and celebrity articles paid for incredible pieces which are actually what comes to mind when thinking of journalism (such as *Watergate*, *Iran-Contra*, the scandal of illegal paybacks made through the Parliament of England), or for the daily surveillance of government clerks, is now falling apart; in fact, the real surprise is that it lasted for as long as it did. Once people were able to read only what they cared about, thanks to the internet, the hundreds of years-old editorial model became ruined. As the number of written press readers is decreasing, this essential quality that newspapers had, that is to expose people not only to what they want to learn, but also to what they need to learn, will have to be taken over by other forms of mass communication. The thought that readers who are interested in the daily horoscope will also want to learn about the riots in the Middle East, or about the advantages and disadvantages of long term bank savings, is completely counterintuitive. Still, this mixture of such different topics and stories is one of the advantages, albeit unintentional, that the written press has to offer in order to defend its social role.

The internet gives people more and more power to choose on their own what they are interested in and to avoid all other topics; this, I think, cannot be changed. The limitless power of journalists to impose the public agenda is becoming more and more threatened by other information disseminators. We cannot tell right now whether this evolution is beneficial or not for society. There have been concerns since the 1930's that readers have too much power over newspapers. Henry Luce, co-founder and head editor of *Time* magazine, expressed his alarm that newspapers offered readers only what they wanted even since before World War 2. The outcome he saw was an avalanche of vulgarity and sensational stories, a tendency to fill the pages of a newspaper with nothing but chatter and gossip. In Luce's view, the press was no longer able to fulfill its duty to deliver such information that a democracy feeds on (Jones, 2009). As we can see, these dilemmas are not new; however, the discussion around them is all the more welcome in the current media environment.

We may ask why we care so much about the written press. In the end, this is history's way: entire industries and technologies are invented, go through their time of glory, and then disappear. The disappearance of the telegraph, or of steam engines, did not come even close to creating such controversy.

The answer pertains rather to the role of the press in general, and that of the written press in particular, in a democratic society. People have always needed information. The sources of information have always been multiple, but newspapers imposed as the best one, because with the industrial revolution and technological development they managed to fill this need effectively. Besides meeting the need of people to be informed, newspapers gradually started to also play, in democratic societies, the role of keeping administration in check. Since power leads to corruption, there had to be instruments devised to oversee what the authorities were doing. This vigilant watch was later extended towards private companies and other types of organizations. Accidentally, the press, a privately owned business, became the most effective means of surveillance over abuses and mistakes. Essentially, the press shook hands with the citizens in a win-win partnership: the press made money, and the citizens were always aware of what their authorities were up to. This partnership remained standing for as long as the economic model on which the written press was holding worked.

Jack Fuller gave a definition for the role that journalism came to play in modern societies, and divided it into four different objectives. "First, a free and self-governing society requires sources of information other than the state in order to remain free and self-governing and to make good public decisions. Second, the quality of governance reflects the quality of the information available to the public. Third, it takes energy, skill, resourcefulness, and often courage to gather and disseminate information when powerful people and institutions do not want the information known. And finally, somehow the attention of people needs to be drawn to important matters, especially when the state and other institutions do not want people to believe they are important (think, for example, of the matter of racial injustice when it was officially countenanced). Fulfilling these needs is the social mission of journalism." (Fuller, 2010, p. 5).

Newspapers have not always had the role of critic and censor of authorities. This attribute evolved starting with mid-19th century, as newspapers grew into strong businesses, more and more independent from the state. Another fact that allowed the liberation of the press was the annulment of laws and regulations that enabled the state to control the press industry – for instance, in the UK, between 1853 and 1861, several laws, that allowed the state to levy a tax based on the amount of advertising or the number of pages of a newspaper, were withdrawn (de Burgh, 2008). The printing press technology evolved, distribution got better, and so the public of newspaper grew larger. Consequently, articles and opinions printed in newspapers gained much more influence over public opinion than before, and led to more temper politicians, who were less prone to strongly arguing against new opinion leaders from the newsrooms of the written press. Additionally, newspapers became financially independent due to the growing incomes that came from advertising.

At the same time, the bourgeoisie, created by economic and technological developments, refused to allow the state any information control, and chose to buy newspapers and invest in them, as they considered it was their duty to learn about any events – both from within the borders and from abroad – that could affect their lives.

Gradually, the hypothesis that citizens have an inalienable right to be correctly informed, and that newspapers are the means to inform them, gained ground in newsrooms, while de-

ontological and moral codes of conduct for journalists were adjusted to fit this new theory. As a result of this idea, many a time have journalists entered fights, with politicians or with state institutions, in which they clearly did not have the upper hand. There are numerous examples, among which, one of the most edifying is the *Pentagon Papers* case.

In June 1971, editor in chief of *The New York Times* decided that the issue of the following day would publish documents declared confidential on the reasons which led to the escalation of the war in Vietnam. These documents were gathered at the request of Robert McNamara, secretary of state to the Lyndon Johnson administration. What they showed was that the American government used means such as misinformation, omissions, and lying, in order to involve the US deeper into the South-East Asia conflict. Even though these materials were not destined for a wider audience, one of the persons in charge of centralizing this information was so appalled that they made a copy and sent it to *The New York Times*. They stirred up endless discussions in the newsroom; some of the editors wanted to publish the articles without citing the documents, others wanted maximum transparency, while the NYT lawyers opposed publication of this information under any form. Eventually, the decision was to publish both the articles written on the topic by NYT journalists, as well as the original documents.

The outcome was nothing short of a storm in the American political environment. The US District Attorney's office sent an official letter to the newspaper in which it requested an immediate cease of publication, on the grounds of the documents being classified and a matter of national security. The NYT editor in chief decided once again that people's right to know is more important than avoiding a legal battle with the US government. As was predicted, the DA's office opened the procedure of blocking the publishing of the documents, and went to the US Supreme Court to sue.

Once *The New York Times* became unable to publish the documents pending the end of the trial, they were offered to the three largest broadcasting networks in the States. All three refused to engage in a direct conflict with the American government. However, such was not the case with other American newspapers. *The Washington Post* took over publishing the documents from where *The New York Times* had left off, and then *The Boston Globe* and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* did the same (up to the point when they were also legally forced to stop doing so). Eventually, the Supreme Court decided that the First Amendment of the US constitution prevented the government to stop the publishing of these documents. If the government could prove that the materials printed in these newspapers could be qualified as espionage, they could sue for it, but only after they had been published. *The Pentagon Papers* were then published entirely, and no paper was accused of espionage (Jones, 2009).

We have seen how the press can play a very important role in society. As a privately owned business, a paper holds more roles than this. The problem is the clash of the two main objectives that a paper has: one the one hand, to serve its community (town, region, state) with honesty and integrity, to act as an instrument of knowledge, for citizens to learn what the people and institutions who lead them or influence their lives are up to, and on the other, to bring profit for its owners. We must understand that the former, meaning the social role of newspapers, evolved throughout the history of the written press. At the beginning, investors had as sole objective selling as many newspapers as possible. So long as newspapers were the only means of mass distribution of information (before television) and companies had no other way of advertising, newspapers reached both objectives without too much trouble, as there was no real competition. Even when television appeared and brought about a series of con-

solidations in the written press, and the disappearance of a large number of papers (in the important US cities, where there had been 4-5 dailies, there were left an average of 2), it did not do too much damage to newspaper owners, because written press still fulfilled certain needs people had and television (for reasons pertaining to the audio-visual) could not meet: the need of analysis, of critique, of making less obvious links between events, and so on. For a long time, newspapers had huge profit margins (the average profit margin of US newspapers was, between 2000 and 2007, for instance, of 27.3% (Mutter, 2008) – a number that the overwhelming majority of all other industries was jealous of).

These huge profit margins were made even a while after the internet spread throughout the world. Newspapers maintained their revenues by cutting down costs, especially those related to personnel – we will get back to this aspect later on. In a US Congress hearing (US Congress hearing [2], 2010), David Simon, former journalist with *The Baltimore Sun*, one of the US newspapers that ceased to exist, admitted that some of the problems that the written press was faced with (at least in the States) were due to being focused on short term profits and to sacrificing the competitive advantage that experienced reporters brought.. *The Baltimore Sun* amputated its news crew in the '90s, even though its profit margin was up to 37%. The big media trusts, which were quoted on the stock market, were constrained to maintain these profit margins no matter what. In 1986, the *Knight Rider* chain got 7 Pulitzers. On that day, the company's shares took a fall. Analysts felt that resources invested in the press investigations that had led to winning the prizes would have been better used by splitting them among shareholders.

Thomas Jefferson said at one point: “information is the currency of democracy. Without access to all the data, Americans cannot make the right decisions, and democracy is threatened”. Governments admitted from the early days of the press that newspapers were a very powerful instrument, able to play the part of both the watchdog of democracy, and the supreme manipulator. Most democratic states tried to protect the press. Sweden issued laws starting with 1766 related to freedom of the press. Starting that time, a free press was considered essential by more and more democratic societies, where the press became protected by constitutional law or special laws. On the other hand, one of the first actions that a totalitarian rule takes is to rule the mass-media.

Although there are many mass-media players (newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations, news agencies, online publications), newspapers play an unusually large role in finding stories of public interest and in imposing topics of discussion on the public agenda. The number of reporters who work for the written press is much higher than for all other means of mass communication together – for instance, in France, 73% of reporters work for printed papers (OECD Report, 2010).

During a US Congress Hearing on the future of the written press and the threat posed by the internet, Tom Rosenstiel, founder and director of the *Project for Excellence in Journalism* of the *Pew Research Center*, stated that “in every community in America I have studied in 26 years of being a press critic, the newspaper in town has more boots on the ground, more reporters and editors than any news organization in the community, usually more than all the other media combined. When we imagine the news ecosystem in the 21st century, the newspaper, with all its problems, is still the largest originating, gathering source.” (US Congress Hearing [1], 2010, p. 7).

A study of the *Pew Center for Excellence in Journalism* (2010) shows that, in a city as large as Baltimore, the two main newspaper trusts (a general interest paper, and the other spe-

cialized on economics and law) are still responsible for 61% of new journalistic topics. Television stations have 28%, radio stations 7% and new-media brings only 4% of new topics. Journalists from the Baltimore Sun (the only daily newspaper left in town) wrote 23,668 articles in 2009, 32% below the 34,852 materials published in 1999 – and 73% less than in 1991, when the two editions (the morning and the evening one) published together 86,667 articles.

The connection between the extent to which citizens are informed and their involvement in social community life was proved by numerous studies. In areas where all newspapers disappeared, voting booths became much emptier. Another reason to worry is the relationship between how well informed people in a certain area are, and the level of corruption in that area. A study published in *The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* proved that “the existence of democratic control mechanisms and of an informed electorate (this variable is measured by the number of newspaper readers) in a community can explain the level of corruption and the degree of effectiveness of its administration” (Adserà, Boix & Payne, 2003, p. 445). The more informed citizens are, the more powerful the sense of civic duty, the awareness of one’s rights, and the desire to know what the authorities are doing to insure a better life for their citizens. Also, corruption and abuse of power are much easier to notice in a community that is well served by a powerful and independent press.

Printed papers are all the more important because they provide the most part of what Robert Entman called *traditional journalism*.

Entman feels that, even though journalism has always had a soft spot for entertainment (and the other way around – there have been shows and Hollywood movies with journalistic tendencies), the development of both television, with its countless channels, and the internet, has blurred the line between the two fields.

Journalism is divided, according to Entman, into four categories (Entman, 2006):

1. Traditional journalism, as in *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* or *România Liberă*;
2. Advocacy journalism, such as in *Weekly Standard* or in shows like *60 minutes*; in Romania, there is *Decât o Revistă*, *Esquire*, and others;
3. Tabloid journalism, represented by papers like *The Sun*, *Bild*, *National Enquirer*, or *Libertatea*;
4. Entertainment.

Entman tells them apart by the extent to which the respective press institutions adhere to five basic principles, and by how these principles are prioritized in their objectives. The principles are accuracy, balance, how involved they are in making the authorities accountable for their actions, and keeping advertising and marketing apart from journalistic work; the fifth principle is their determination in looking for profit. Both the organizations’ commitment to these principles, and the significance of each principle, are important. Traditional journalism follows all these principles; the most important one is the role of watchdog, then comes profit-making, and after that, supplying the information needed for people to understand the world around them.

To tabloid journalism, profit always comes first, and this makes the other principles be directed towards this one primary goal. Such newspaper pages and shows are filled with what the public wants. Journalistic materials – in their classic sense – are present only if they arouse enough interest or can be approached from a tabloid angle.

Advocacy journalism does not place profit first; in fact, it can be rather ignorant to profit. Its purpose is to influence the public agenda. Accuracy and balance can be ignored for the

sake of getting the right message through on behalf of those who pay for the article or show (this type of journalism is more often than not unable to self-sustain).

The last category is entertainment, portrayed by shows such as *The Oprah Winfrey Show* or *Surprise, surprise*. Here too, the main purpose is making profit, but the second most important is to entertain. There is no commitment to accuracy, balance, or separating journalism from marketing.

Accurately informing citizens is very important to a democracy; this task is mostly fulfilled by traditional journalism institutions, which take into account all five principles mentioned above, and which support the army of reports whose investigations, even if not all at *Watergate* level, imply showing up at the city hall or prefecture every day, asking questions, searching for answers, and who, by doing this, convey an important message to authorities: *we are watching you*.

Next to the newspapers' domination on the market of worthy topics to write about, a study conducted by Klaus Schönbach, Ester de Waal, and Edmund Lauf (2005) showed that if you compare them with online sites, printed newspapers are more effective in broadening horizons for those who read them, in familiarizing them with topics or events they would not otherwise be interested in. This quality of the printed press is added to that of censorship and critique of power (be it administrative, political, or commercial), and shows us the importance of the role that newspapers have built in democratic societies in the last four centuries.

During this period of decline of number of issues sold, there are also some success stories, newspapers that have had increased sales and incomes. Usually, they have to do with press campaigns on events which have a crucial impact on their readers' lives. Such is the story of the *Idaho Post Register* (Jones, 2009), which chose to put the prominent and well respected figure in the area, the head of Mormon Boy Scouts, on the spot with their questions, in a state where the Mormon community was very influential and the Boy Scouts Organization is akin to a second religion. The resulting revelations brought protests, intimidation acts, threats, boycott, and Mormon business men pulling out of advertising deals. Nevertheless, the newspaper persevered, ratings grew, and in the end, justice decided that the person of interest was guilty of being a pedophile and the journalistic investigation proved that the Utah Chiefs of Boy Scouts concealed other similar lewd acts committed by their members. In the end, the newspaper fulfilled its duty to the community and the community acknowledged it.


A similar story happened with the *Lexington Herald-Leader* in Kentucky (Jones, 2009), which published a series of articles on the less ethical jock recruitment practices within the University of Kentucky. Here in Lexington, too, basketball is almost a religion. But at the same time as the protests and the boycotts nurtured by those targeted by the investigation, the newspaper noticed a substantial increase of the number of issues sold. These are but two examples which show that if newspapers honestly tell people what is going on around them, and how it affects them, their issues will simply fly off the shelves.

Even with all these encouraging examples, the big picture is still much more somber. In every developed country, the number of newspapers sold is decreasing. Ratings, on the other hand, are increasing. Below, I will explain this apparent paradox.

4. Newspapers' Revenue

The revenues of newspapers in developed countries have been decreasing for several years, and this decrease became more severe due to the crisis. In the below graph, based on data of an OECD Report from 2010, the substantial decrease between 2007 and 2009 can be easily observed (a decrease that continued in the following years):

Figure 1. The decrease in revenue suffered by the printed press in OECD countries.




Ever since the beginning of written press, newspapers have relied on two main sources of income: advertising (classifieds and printed ads within the pages of the publication) and sales (at the local newsstand, street vendors, or via subscriptions).

Because the newspaper was initially thought as a means to reach as many people as possible, it was perfect for advertising. Once radio and television appeared, the sources of information diversified, and the financial pie got split into more pieces. Even after television appeared, the revenue generated by advertising in the pages of printed publications continued to rise, because more and more money were spent on publicity. And even if the cake was split in several slices, it kept getting bigger and bigger.

The first important slice in newspaper revenue that was lost to the internet was the classified ads category. For several years, they had been an important and constant income source for the newspapers:


Figure 2. The evolution of advertising revenues in the United States.



The advantages brought by the spreading of internet access, when it comes to the classifieds (concentrating various ads in all fields and geographical areas on a small number of sites – the most important being *Craigslist*, the possibility to sort according to various criteria and search by key words) has made this type of revenue, of American newspapers, decrease a lot starting with the middle of last decade.

Newspapers have always gained a bigger income from selling ratings to ad makers, rather than selling their content to the public. According to information obtained from central and local newspapers, in Romania, around 25% of revenue comes from selling the newspaper (newsstands and subscriptions) and the other 75% from advertising. Below is a graph which shows the percentages of revenue of newspapers, which have come from both advertising and sales respectively, in a series of developed countries (the data was collected by the OECD):

Figure 3. The percentage of publicity in revenue of newspapers within the OECD countries.




The advertising revenues of the Romanian written press have considerably decreased in the last 3 years as well, after a long period of constant growth. The amounts of money gathered from magazines and newspapers in 2010 were less than half than the ones raised in 2003 (from around 60 million € to less than 30 million €).

For a while, especially before the economic crisis, newspapers had hoped that the amounts they lost in printed advertising would be brought back by ads on their websites. The revenue generated by newspapers' internet pages really grew, but they could not compensate for the more significant drops in traditional advertising. It is estimated that in the United States, out of \$7 lost in printed advertising, only \$1 is recovered in online advertising: one report (Pew Center for Excellence in Journalism, 2012) shows that 42% of visitors on press institution sites, be they traditional or online, do not click on commercials, and 35% rarely do so (Pew Center for Excellence in Journalism, 2010).

This financing system has worked as long as newspapers had a quasi-monopoly on information and its distribution. For a lack of better instruments, advertisers used what was available in order to bring their ads in front of the public: both television stations and the printed press. This symbiosis was interrupted by the internet.

The downward tendency in advertising budgets for printed press does not seem to be stopping. The instruments used for the measurement of advertising efficiency, both printed, as well as visual, were and still are, approximate, and the reason is a simple one: these distribution channels are one directional. The creation of the internet gave advertisers the opportunity to create specific ads for targeted groups, to find out in real time the degree of success of ad campaigns, and to alter them in case the results were below expectations. Another extremely important fact is that advertising companies will always spend money where the ratings are. The below graph, according to data taken from the *Business Insider Intelligence* (Cocotas, 2012), summarizes extremely well the reason advertising will continue to move towards the internet and mobile stations:

Figure 4. A comparison between amounts gathered from advertising, according to the means of mass communication.



At the point when the quantity of raw information offered gravitates toward infinity, its price gravitates towards zero. This does not mean the journalistic materials are worthless, but rather that new models of reward need to be found for a journalist's work, and that newspapers should try to step out of the "yesterday's news" paradigm – for a person with internet access, it is no longer interesting to check yesterday's election or game results; they already had this piece of information in real time, but an analysis of the causes and effects of these results might be interesting.

5. Cost Structure

The combination between the boom of the internet and the economic crisis is “the perfect storm” for the written press. The seemingly unsolvable problem that newspapers are now faced with is the cost structure of a printed newspaper.

The Romanian news editors that I have spoken with told me that it is sales incomes that would ideally cover both printing and distribution, while advertising would take care of profits. The same OECD study that I mentioned before gives a detailed account of the cost structure of a daily paper from Germany: 24% goes to content creation, 27% to production, 24% to sales and distribution, 16% to advertising, and 9% to administration.

The cost ratio varies lightly from one country to another, but there is also one thing that remains the same: the fixed costs of a newspaper are always bigger than the journalistic costs. Creating the content of the newspaper (staff salaries and travelling, layout and design) only accounts for around 25% of costs. The rest is swallowed by printing, distribution, marketing, and administrative costs. These are largely fixed costs; for instance, the difference between printing 100,000 and 140,000 papers is trivial; in the printing room, the most expensive part is preparing the presses for the offset printing.

These two things – accelerated advertising income reduction and the large amount of fixed costs, are leading newspapers into bankruptcy. *Gazeta Sporturilor*, for instance, cashed in 2 million euros out of advertising in 2008, but dropped to 150,000 in 2012. Newspapers are trying to slow down the impact of these income decreases and find alternate solutions; they use multiple strategies, but the simplest and the most often employed is cutting staff (especially reporters and editors), cutting pay, and cutting foreign correspondents and foreign offices. In the United Kingdom, a study that compared articles on foreign affairs between 1979 and 2009 showed a 39% decrease in the number of such articles in the 4 most popular dailies (2 tabloids and 2 reference newspapers), and an even more accelerated decrease, of 80%, in the same kind of articles appeared on the first 10 pages of the newspapers included in the study (Moore, 2010).

This decimation of newsrooms leads to a greater addiction to press agencies and to the overwhelming of the journalists left in the newsrooms – leaving them with less and less time for each story and each extended investigation. The overall effect of these transformations is lower quality of articles. Moreover, newspapers have entered a vicious circle: in order to remain profitable, they fire reporters and editors – the very people who turn newspapers into buyable products. The lower quality of the articles leads to a lower number of readers, lower incomes from advertising, which in turn leads to new staff cuts, and the circle keeps spinning.

6. Possible Solutions

Newspapers are aware of the profound crisis they are facing. The internet is threatening their structure and the economic model that has kept them at the surface for over two centuries. They all agree that the written press is going through a major crisis. However, there is yet no consensus on the solution for exiting the crisis.

One of the most popular solutions is having a fee paid for reading an online article. During the last years, more and more papers have built a *paywall* around articles on their site. Some newspapers allow free daily or monthly access to a certain number of articles (such as *The New York Times*); others do not. Links towards articles can sometimes be accessed (again,

The New York Times), other times not. Quite often, the subscribers of the printed edition also get free access to the online edition; this is an attempt to support the printed edition, which, for most papers, is still a valuable source of advertising incomes. Those in favor of this solution state that readers used to pay for information before the internet, and that they need to be educated to do so again.

However, this argument is undermined by the fact that it is not clear what newspaper buyers were actually paying *for*. Many experts argue that readers have always paid for comfort – in order to have the paper brought to their mailbox or to the newspaper stand they found on their way to work. Paul Graham stated (2009) that all forms of news industry were (and still are) organized as if the product was the written support or medium, while the content was irrelevant (the price of books, as well as of newspapers, has more to do with printing and distribution costs than with their literary value). Content producers can levy a tax when they completely control the distribution channel. Radio stations are free because no one can stop access to radio waves. The internet was originally designed as a distribution channel with paid access (in order to cover infrastructure costs), but free use. This model is not compatible with the economic model of the printed press.

The paywall success stories are represented either by the financial press (*Wall Street Journal*, *Financial Times*) – people have always been willing to pay for information that can make them earn more, and the subscription has often been covered by employers – or, in the words of Clay Shirky, by newspapers that hold top positions in the *God Forbid* (as in God forbid this newspaper disappeared) classification – usually newspapers in larger cities of famous brands such as the *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, the *Chicago Sun-Times*, or *The New York Times*. All other newspapers which introduced such a tax lost a lot of visitors (around 90%). This led to loss of online advertising incomes (can the 5-10 percent of readers that pay make up for the advertising incomes generated by the other 90-95 percent that formerly accessed the site?). The type of paywall used by *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* tries to borrow the best of both worlds (because most readers will not exceed the free articles limit, they will also maintain the advertising incomes, while the really loyal readers will cover the subscription incomes).

In Romania, some papers tried to introduce a fee – such as *Academia Ca?avencu*, between 2002 and 2006, when it was the most popular weekly newspaper in Romania. An interesting case is also *Dilema Veche*, which also recently built a paywall that allows free access to part of its columns, and full access to all the content of the magazine and all exclusive materials.

One other issue that this type of model has is that it essentially brings nothing new. It is only a line of defense, a “dam built of sandbags”. It tries to stop the bleeding of readers and incomes by applying parts of the same economic model to a different medium. It can work for very large and popular newspapers, which start off with a large number of readers, and also for very small papers, which serve a small and strong community, and where they are seen as irreplaceable. However, most newspapers fit in between the two extremes, where there aren’t many success stories.

The value that quality journalism has for a certain community is very hard to estimate. As journalism is a product, it is by definition “non-exclusive”: it can be “consumed” even if not paid for, while, regardless of the number of people who access (read, hear, see it), it will always be available to more people. In this sense, it can be considered a public good. The trouble is that people do not really care to pay (let alone pay *more*) for a public good.

We can find an example of how difficult a financial evaluation is in a series of articles (Ovaska, Neff & Raynor, 2008) published in 2008 in the *News & Observer* from Raleigh, North Carolina, about the US parole system. Their investigation revealed that 580 convicts released on parole committed crimes between 2000 and 2008. These articles were a game-changer for the program. The investigation took over six months, involved several journalists and editors, and cost around \$200,000 (Hamilton, 2009). The benefits brought about by the work of these journalists were important to the whole state, but they are still very hard to quantify: it is likely that some of the citizens in that state are still alive today thanks to the articles published in the winter of 2008, but nobody (and least of all, themselves) can be absolutely sure that this actually is the reason.

The solutions forwarded are not limited to making readers pay. Press institutions have been long complaining about news aggregators (such as *Google News* or *Yahoo News*) using their materials without paying, and even more, earning advertising incomes by publishing advertisements on the pages where they extract articles from news sites, without sharing those incomes with the news originators (OECD Report, 2010). *Google* and *Yahoo* are currently engaged in several negotiations to solve these claims of press institutions. At the same time, both parties are careful not to be too aggressive: *Google* and *Yahoo* know that they do not generate content, but only use materials created by other sources; at the same time, newspapers, TV stations and press agencies are aware that a large part of viewers access their sites via search engines or the aggregators such as *Google New*.

Another way to save the newspapers, which was popular especially between 2008 and 2010, when it was thought that the financial crisis would ruin the press, was state support. The enthusiasts of this solution argued that it would not have been the first time when the states supported the press. The US funded the distribution of press by lowering related postal taxes starting with 1792, when the first postal law was passed (these exemptions were gradually reduced until they practically disappeared in 1970). In France, all youths aged between 18 and 24 have the right to a free subscription to a newspaper of their choice, with the state covering the cost of its distribution. This measure is part of a bigger plan of assisting the French press, adopted by the Nicholas Sarkozy administration in 2009.

During a US Congress hearing on the future of journalism in the United States, Frank A. Blethen, director of the *Seattle Times* envisioned several aspects which could be covered by state intervention: tax reductions for journalists and the deduction of newspaper subscriptions, press institution loans that are guaranteed by the state, reinstated privileged postal taxes for printed papers, looser anti-trust limitations for printed press, and direct state aids for papers (US Congress Hearing [2], 2010). As for TV stations, states usually tie granting a license to performing a public service. It is true that the institutions that make sure that happens (*Federal Communication Commission* in the US, and *Consiliul Național al Audiovizualului* in Romania) could be less lenient in their evaluation of TV stations, especially of public TV stations. In the US, for instance, *The Federal Communication Commission*, in its 75 of existence, approved over 100,000 broadcasting license renewals. There have only been 4 cases of denied renewal, on the grounds that the respective TV stations were not fulfilling their duty towards the public (Waldman, 2011).

Nevertheless, these possible state interventions are not appreciated by one and all. First of all, this idea is accused of trying to keep the current model unchanged, even though the environment in which it worked best was based on scarce information and advertising space shaped by demand (the *scarcity model*), and it is no longer suitable for a time of abundant in-

formation, a time of the internet. Secondly, many journalists are worried that a state intervention would inevitably bring more or less obvious pressure on what pieces are published or broadcasted. The reputation and prestige of the press relies exactly on journalistic independence from government influence.

Another beacon of hope came from the non-profit sector and foundations that could either support press institutions or create new ones, along the model of US education institutions, funded mostly through donations. Here, too, there are successful stories. The most well-known is *ProPublica*, a non-profit organization that conducts journalistic investigations – either through its own journalists, or in collaboration with other press institutions. *ProPublica* is the first online press institution to receive the Pulitzer prize, the highest distinction in US journalism (*ProPublica* also won a Pulitzer in 2010, in collaboration with *New York Times Magazine*, and in 2011, for a series of articles written exclusively by their own journalists, which were only published on the *ProPublica* website). Other such examples are the *Voice of San Diego*, the Minneapolis *MinnPost*, the Chicago *ChiTown Daily News*, the New York *Gotham Gazette*, or the Maine *Village Soup*.

However, according to several researchers, these success stories cannot be replicated throughout the whole journalistic industry. Firstly, most investigations and field work take place locally. The amounts spent by newspapers for this part of their work, although decreasing for several years, are still impressive: the *Dallas Morning News* alone annually invests over \$30 million in inquiries, investigations, and in that which Americans elegantly call *reporting* (US Congress Hearing [2], 2010). An approximate calculation made by Zachary M. Seward and Alan Mutter (Seward, 2009) shows that in order to support the same number of journalists that American newspapers had in 1990, foundations should provide \$114 billion, and materials would only be published online, in order to save money on printing and distribution. This amount would mean combined funding from the 10 largest foundations in the United States. Another study, on the most promising online publications (nonprofit as well as commercial) that do local journalism in the USA, has demonstrated that over half of them have revenue under \$50,000 a year, three quarters of these have revenue under \$100,000 yearly and under 3% make more than \$1 million a year (McLellan & Reynolds, 2010).

In 2010, the largest 12 online non-profit publications had 88 hired reporters (we should not forget that tenths of thousands of reporters, editors, and designers were let go in the United States in recent years). Various foundations have approved, since 2005, over \$245 million (J-Lab Knight Community News Network, 2012) in grants and donations in order to support field journalism. It is estimated that 2008 alone (Edmonds, 2009) newspapers in the United States reduced their editorial costs (especially the salary funds for journalists, their travel expenses, subscriptions for press agents, or trainings) with over \$1.6 billion.

I am not trying to say that all of the \$1.6 billion needs to be replaced annually in order for journalism (in this case in the USA) to relive a golden age. I have noted these figures in order to demonstrate the differences in order of size between what the online press can do with the help of various nonprofit organizations and the continuous reduction of funding that traditional press institutions, specifically newspapers, have lost in the last years, and continue to lose.

On the other hand, even if this money, or part of it, would come from nonprofit organizations, they in turn get their money from somewhere else. What this means is that editorial pressure could appear, same as with a governmental aid. Another noticeable fact is that foundations

may change the destination of their money at any time (like when management changes), because their main purpose is not the same as that of press institutions.

In most cases, in order for press to be independent, it needs to be profitable. Although there is talk of the imminent death of the printed press in developed countries, most newspapers are still profitable (even if the profit margin they were used have gone). The worrying fact is the decrease in the number of readers and revenues from advertising, at the same time. On the other hand, this very panic in the air leads to an effervescence of ideas on how the press can be saved, to the proposal and testing of a multitude of economic and editorial models, to the launch of a considerable number of pilot programs in order to test as many ideas as possible (Jones, 2009). A new, universal model that can be applied in most cases will probably not be found, but rather a multitude of possibilities, each suited for certain situations. This could be considered, at the rate things are going now, as a big success. Or rather, in order to keep the momentum, a series of successes. In order for it to happen, the public needs to understand that, in the words of Bill Kovach (2008), “the news they now acquire for free will rapidly diminish in quality and value if a new way is not found to fund its production by careful practitioners.”

7. Conclusions

Following all the above examples, we can easily notice that printed newspapers in developed countries are faced with a series of complicated problems. These problems ultimately threaten their very existence. As shown, of all the means of mass communication, newspapers have the highest number of reporters, uncover the most original topics, and have the most influence in bringing topics to the political agenda.

I mentioned above that investigative journalism is that side of journalism that we all think of when we consider the effects of disappearing newspaper trusts. In the words of Higo de Burgh, this type of journalism “brings to light whatever others are trying to hide” (de Burgh, 2008, p. 15). The more people are affected by the part they want hidden, or the more it threatens the rule-of-law or is a breach of democratic rules, the more interesting that topic becomes. Of course, not all that is kept hidden is subject to investigation. One of the essential roles of press is to publicly uncover fact. Journalists are not called only to express their disagreement with how society works, but, starting from particular cases, they need to show signs of concern and demonstrate how unfit some parts of the community are to its own standards.

Some researchers (Neiva, 1995) consider that the golden period of American press ended when newspaper trusts were sold by the families who had owned them (usually for several generations) to commercial press trusts, media corporations which were interested way too much in profits and way too little in the role that press should have in a society, especially after they were listed in the stock exchange.

The number of professional reporters and editors who left the newspapers is so high that replacing them will be extremely difficult. Some theorists and supporters of civic journalism, active especially on the internet (amongst the most ardent supporters we find Jay Rosen and Dan Gilmore) hope that these professionals will be replaced by a lot of amateur journalists, connected via social networking. Their common efforts would lead to just as effective a result as that of professional journalists. These hopes have yet to be fulfilled for most cases. As

David Simon describes it: “a neighbor with a garden hose does not a fireman make” (US Congress Hearing, [2], 2010, p. 29). Journalism is a profession, just as firefighting.

At this time, for the printed press, the outcome of the rise of the internet and the financial crisis translates into a decrease in ratings, in the number of journalists employed, and, considerably, in revenue; the destruction of the economical and editorial model.

Presently, newspapers are in a continuous rearguard battle, trying to survive just long enough to reinvent themselves. The vast majority of newspapers are now going through a period when they are trying to mimic the few publications (*Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, and *The New York Times*) which have *paywalls* for their online versions that actually work. This move causes two main issues. Firstly, not all newspapers can be *The New York Times* or can have such a valuable content for certain types of public like the *Wall Street Journal* or *The Economist*. Secondly, through these attempts, newspapers are trying to transfer an economic model from the printed edition to their internet editions. The problem is that this new information environment is extremely different, and publishing information can no longer be controlled. Controlling information, the advantage that traditional press has had for a long period of time, was ensured by the complicated and expensive system of collecting and distributing the finite product (newspapers, news bulletins etc.). Once the internet appeared, the cost of distribution is close to nothing, while every kind of information is offered from a multitude of sources. This multiplication of sources of information makes it necessary to find new ways to pay for them. Even if distribution is no longer an obstacle, quality information, the product of the journalistic act, is not free of charge. Until now, newspapers did not know (nor did they want to know) which part of the bulk of daily topics the public has been paying the price on the cover for.

Newspapers offer another set of services. News and investigations, of course, but also sports, classifieds, gossip, paparazzi shots, and discount coupons. All of these made us buy the newspaper, because there was no other place for us to get them from. But now we can break it down: we get our international news from the *New York Times* or *The Economist*, our local news from *CityNews* or *Ora de Cluj*, sports from *gsp.ro*, coupons from *Groupon* and classifieds from *okazii.ro*; at the same time we tip over the bundle model which newspapers have been relying on almost throughout their entire history.

The media environment is undoubtedly much more alert and crowded. Many of the new actors fight for public attention. But most of these new actors lack the resources or the knowledge necessary to achieve what newspapers have accustomed us to for hundreds of years. The current type of online journalism looks like a return to the origins of journalism, a combination of opinion, pamphlet and commercialism.

If indeed we view press as the fourth estate, the deep alterations it is going through may be considered a time of recalculation of the entire political system inside democratic states.

The future of the printed press is inevitably linked to the internet. Although, until now, we have used the phrase “written press” in order to define only printed publications, crossing over to the online environment is inevitable, and the written press will shortly mean press that uses written text, regardless if letters appear on a piece of paper, on a computer, mobile, telephone, or tablet screen. What we don’t yet know is whether and how much time we will still have an *interregnum* between the moments when newspapers will become, within journalism, an insignificant actor and when other forms of journalistic organization, amongst which we see online publications as important actors, will take over. The need to be informed, to participate inside the community, to debate events which affect our lives, has not decreased

once the internet appeared, but rather increased and still increases as people become more and more connected to this global network. We do not necessarily need newspapers anymore, but we do need journalism.

It is a time for innovation. In the words of Clay Shirky, “nothing is sure to work, but anything might” (Shirky, 2009).

References

1. Adserà, A., Boix, C., & Payne, M. (2003). Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government. *The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, 19 (2).
2. Cocotas, A. (2012). *Here's Why Mobile Ad Spend Won't Ever Catch Up with Eyeballs*. Retrieved August 10, 2012, from http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-05-08/tech/31618243_1_mobile-advertising-ad-impressions-ad-networks.
3. de Burgh, H. (Ed.). (2008). *Investigative Journalism. Second Edition*, New York: Routledge.
4. Dunnett, P. J. S. (1988). *The world newspaper industry*, Croom Helm.
5. Edmonds, R. (2009). *Shrinking Newspapers Have Created \$1.6 Billion News Deficit*, Retrieved August 21, 2012, from <http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/business-news/the-biz-blog/98784/shrinking-newspapers-have-created-1-6-billion-news-deficit>.
6. Emery, E. & Michael Emery, M. (1978). *The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media*, Fourth Edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
7. Entman, R. M. (2006). The Nature and Sources of News. In Overholser, G., Hall Jamieson, K., (Eds.). *Institutions of American Democracy: The Press*, New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Fuller, J. (2010) *What is happening to news : the information explosion and the crisis in journalism*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
9. Graham, P. (2009). *Post-Medium Publishing*, Retrieved August 16, 2012, from <http://www.paulgraham.com/publishing.html>.
10. Hamilton, J. T. (2009) *Subsidizing the Watchdog: What Would it Cost to Support Investigative Journalism at a Large Metropolitan Daily Newspaper?*. Paper presented at Duke Conference on Nonprofit Media, May 4-5, 2009.
11. J-Lab Knight Community News Network. (2013). *New Media Makers*. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from http://www.kcnn.org/toolkit/funding_database.
12. Johnson, C. *Sloppy Reporting on the Self Driving Car*. Retrieved August 6, 2012, from <http://www.informationdiet.com/blog/read/read-this-not-that-the-self-driving-car>.
13. Jones, A. S. (2009). *Losing the News. The Future of the News that Feed Democracy*, Oxford University Press.
14. Kovach, B. (2008). *12 Questions about the future of journalism*. Retrieved August 16, 2012, from <http://www.medios.org.ar/?p=96>.
15. Lewis, J., Williams, A., Franklin, B., Thomas, J., & Nick Mosdell, (2008) *The Quality and Independence of British Journalism. Tracking the changes over 20 years*. Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies.
16. Martin, S. E. & Copeland, D. A. (Eds.), (2003). *The Function of Newspapers in Society: A Global Perspective*, Westport: Praeger.
17. McAthy, R. *Global circulation falls as readers become 'promiscuous'*. Retrieved August 2, 2012, from <http://www.journalism.co.uk/news/global-circulation-falls-as-readers-become-promiscuous-/s2/a546340>.
18. McLellan, M. & Donald W. Reynolds Journalism Institute. (2010). *Block by Block: Building A New Ecosystem*, Retrieved August 21, 2012, from <http://www.rjionline.org/fellows-program/mcLellan/block-by-block/part-3.php>.

19. Moore, M. (2010). *Shrinking World. The decline of international reporting in the British press*, Media Standards Trust.
20. Mutter, A. D. *Newsroom staffing hits 34-year low*, Retrieved August 6, 2012, from <http://newsosaur.blogspot.co.uk>.
21. Mutter, A. D. (2008) *Fat newspaper profits are history*, Retrieved August 3, 2012, from <http://newsosaur.blogspot.ro/2008/10/fat-newspaper-profits-are-history.html>.
22. Neiva, E. M., (1995). Chain Building: The Consolidation of the American Newspaper Industry, 1955-1980. *Business And Economic History*, (24) 1, 22-25.
23. OECD Report (2010). *The Evolution of News and the Internet*.
24. Ovaska, S., Neff, J., Raynor, D. (2008). *Probationers kill, state dawdles*, Retrieved August 19, 2012, from <http://www.newsobserver.com/2008/12/07/56083/probationers-kill-state-dawdles.html>.
25. Pew Center for Excellence for Journalism. (2010). *How News Happens: A Study of the News Ecosystem of One American City*, 2010.
26. Pew Center for Excellence in Journalism. (2012) *The Search for a New Business Model. An in-depth look at how newspapers are faring trying to build digital revenue*.
27. Pew Research Center for Excellence in Journalism (2010). *State of the News Media 2010*. Retrieved August 20, 2012, from <http://stateofthemedias.org/2010/online-summary-essay/economics-attitudes>.
28. Schönbach, K., de Waal, E. & Lauf, E. (2005). Online and Print Newspapers: Their Impact on the Extent of the Perceived Public Agenda. *European Journal of Communication*, 20 (2005), 245-258.
29. Seward, Z. M. (2009). *Endowing every U.S. newspaper: \$114 billion. Innovation: Priceless*. Retrieved August 17, 2012, from <http://www.niemanlab.org/2009/01/endowing-every-american-newspaper-114-billion-innovation-priceless>.
30. Shirky, C. (2009). *Newspapers and Thinking the Unthinkable*, Retrieved August 6, 2012, from <http://www.shirky.com/weblog/2009/03/newspapers-and-thinking-the-unthinkable>.
31. Starkman, D. (2010). The Hamster Wheel. Why running as fast as we can is getting us nowhere. *Columbia Journalism Review*. Retrieved May 10, 2013 from http://www.cjr.org/cover_story/the_hamster_wheel.php?page=all.
32. Ștefan, A. *Toamna se număra concedierile: Vezi că?i jurnali?ti că?i vor pierde job-ul*. Retrieved August 2, 2012, from <http://www.dailybusiness.ro/stiri-media-marketing/toamna-se-numara-concedierile-vezi-cati-jurnalisti-isi-vor-pierde-job-ul-67602>.
33. Stepp, C. S. (2009). The quality—control quandary: as newspapers shed copy editors and post more and more unedited stories online, what's the impact on their content? *American Journalism Review*, 2 (31) April-May.
34. US Congress Hearing. (2010). *The Future of Journalism*, 6 mai 2009. U.S. Government Printing Office.
35. US Congress Hearing. (2010). *The Future of Newspapers: The Impact on the Economy and Democracy*. September 24, 2009, U.S. Government Printing Office.
36. Waldman, S. (2011). *The Information Needs of Communities. The changing media landscape in a broadband age*, Federal Communications Commission.

Mira MOSHE*

European IPTV and the digital divide

Abstract

By the end of 2011, 34.3m households took a pay IPTV subscription as their primary TV service. Estimates are that these figures will more than double over the next five years, reaching 76.5mn by the end of 2016. Revenues are expected to increase from 6.2bn U.S. dollars in 2011 to 11.9bn U.S. dollars in 2016. However, penetration will remain relatively low, with only 5% of the world's TV households expected to subscribe to IPTV platforms by 2016.¹ This study deals with the digital divide in Europe in terms of a) adopting service providers – IPTV inequality between regarding service providers; b) households subscribers – IPTV inequality between regarding households subscribers; and c) inequality between EU countries and other European countries with regard to consumer expenditures.

Keywords: IPTV; Digital Divide; Provision; Consumption; Expenditure; EU.

IPTV is considered a bridge for reducing the digital divide (Kawamori, 2010). In 2006, for example, Telecom Italia launched an important Anti-Digital Divide Plan aimed at covering the largest possible number of towns that generate low revenues and/or are not as yet equipped with optical infrastructures. As a result, by the end of 2010, 97% of Telecom Italia's total fixed lines were covered by ADSL and 61.8% were covered by IPTV. (For further information, see: <http://2010annualreport.telecomitalia.com/sren/Externalstakeholders/Digital-Divide.html>.) Modern IPTV is bringing two-way interactive rich-media point-to-point digital information exchanges to the mass market. It can be used to deliver multi-channel (50, 100, 500 or more channels) and/or Web TV information and entertainment channels (personal channels on-demand by the consumer). However, the implications of the new IPTV service infrastructure are rapidly expanding beyond the mere viewing of football and television reruns. The new IPTV and Web TV broadband infrastructure is the first meaningful effort to resolve the digital divide and extend modern enterprise information services (IS) to the mass market. This could in fact affect advertising and retailing processes that drive local and global economies (Gunn, 2007). Hence, this study examines the often-discussed notion of the "digital divide" by performing a comparative secondary statistical analysis on data originally produced by the European Audiovisual Observatory in 2001 and by portraying the growth of IPTV services across Europe (both within and outside the EU). Whilst both of these issues have been subject to previous research (particularly the "digital divide"), combining the two here highlights some of the key differences among European countries, as well as the uneven development of IPTV services among EU and non-EU states.

* Ariel University, Israel, miram@ariel.ac.il.

1. Internet protocol TV (IPTV)

For the past thirty years, telecommunications firms have continually attempted to introduce a new intelligent television system by making the best use of ever-developing information and communication technologies, changes in media consumption patterns, the collapse of regulatory barriers, and so on. Internet protocol TV (IPTV) is the most recent version of such corporate attempts (Kim, 2009). Thus, it is not surprising that there is a lot of buzz and excitement surrounding IPTV. This technology is growing in importance and affecting business models of traditional pay TV network operators (O'Driscoll, 2008). But what does IPTV mean? According to the International Telecommunication Union focus group on IPTV, it is defined as „...multimedia services such as television/video/audio/text/graphics/data delivered over IP based networks managed to provide the required level of QoS/QoE, security, interactivity and reliability“ (Koleyni, 2006, p. 3). The EU audiovisual policy information centre explains that „IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) delivers digital TV over a broadband connection. Instead of a bouquet of broadcast services being delivered simultaneously to a customer who then selects one to watch using a TV tuner, the viewer requests an individual service from the server. The service is then streamed to the home for viewing using the internet protocol and other technologies known as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL).“ (For further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/info_centre/a_z/index_en.htm#i.) But IPTV is not an application per se; it is a host of applications centered on IP, user choice and rich content (Pfeffer, 2006). This means that: **a)** the whole delivery chain of IPTV is similar to that of cable, satellite or terrestrial transmission, and under the control of an operator (e.g. AT&T) and of that operator's middleware vendor(s), such as Microsoft's Mediaroom or Nokia Siemens Network's Myrio (Montpetit, Klym and Mirlacherm, 2011); **b)** IPTV provides the “me, too” list of services namely traditional linear TV programs, Video on Demand (VoD), Pay-Per-View (PPV) and Electronic Program Guides (EPGs), as well as additional services such as traffic and weather while providing a “lean-back” experience (Montpetit, Klym and Mirlacherm, 2011); **c)** the advent of IPTV reflects media convergence. However, there have also been challenges involved in IPTV adoption; in particular, the fact that little is known about the factors determining it (Dulal, Kim, Lee and Kim, 2012).

2. The digital divide and IPTV

As a result of the European Commission agenda of “analogue switch-off” and “digital switch-over” (Iosifidis, 2006) in the contemporary configuration of power relations in the television sector, distributors are much more dominant in the “cultural industries” (Christophers, 2008). This is especially relevant, for IPTV since it significantly boosts advertiser-supported “free” content (Cunningham, 2012). From the socio-technical standpoint, the development of IPTV implies that it will be driven by external factors (the market and the users) (Shin, 2007), as well as enabling more personalized content and an interactive user experience (Blasco-Arcas, Aznar-Baranda, Hernandez-Ortega & Ruiz-Mas, 2011). In other words, the provision of high quality broadband services such as IPTV re-raises the issue of the national digital divide.

The term “digital divide” is used to describe unequal access to computers, the Internet and online information, whether among individuals, communities or countries (Warschauer,

2011). It has been a symbolic banner for politicians and corporate largesse insofar as it has served as a substitute for more direct action against inequalities of income, education and race (Strover, 2003). But it reaches far beyond a symbolic discourse per se. It is as much a symptom as a cause of broader techno-economic phenomena (Parayil, 2005). A country's telecommunications systems, for example, play a major role in public utilities and industries (Trebing, 2004) and every country has to provide the necessary infrastructure for a homegrown IT industry (Leibovitch, 2003). Thus, since the digital divide makes it possible to compare between rich and poor, many developing countries are responding to the need to develop ICT skills among their citizens (James, 2008). However, education, age and dominant vocational activity do indeed continue to mark digital boundaries in many of the observed countries (Lengsfeld, 2011). As an issue of public policy, the digital divide has generated a significant body of research from a wide range of disciplines; it is constantly expanding to encompass an increasingly complex array of issues and problems (Stevenson, 2009). Still, for many years the extent and nature of the digital divide were dependent on the type of access definitions (Van Dijk & Hacker, 2003). The term "digital divide" has been in use for almost a decade and typically relates to socio-demographic differences in the way information and communications technology is utilized (Vehovar, Sicherl, Hüsing & Dolnicar, 2006). In other words, the issue is not simply about connectivity, but about accessing, using and contributing to the internet (Ortiz, 2008).

An important determinant of whether the digital divide will become narrower or wider is the level of access to broadband in general and to IPTV in particular. Many European governments have been actively pushing and investing in broadband for social and domestic purposes (Hopper, 2007). In 2005, the eEurope Advisory Group urged governments to provide "universal services," namely broadband internet, to its citizens (Kettelman, 2008). The eEurope 2005 group essentially focused on the development of broadband access at competitive prices, network security and improved usage of information technology on the part of public bodies (Bauer, 2008). Hence, it is worthwhile examining whether these efforts have succeeded in reducing the European digital divide. This study examines the narrowing of European technology gaps by focusing on IPTV as a representative case study.

3. Methodology

Research question – This research study focused on the question of whether it is possible to identify a digital divide in Europe in whatever is related to IPTV services. The existence or non-existence of such a gap was examined by means of analyzing three major axes: providers/provision, consumers/consumption and expenditure. In order to answer the central research question, three subordinate questions were asked:

1. Is there a digital divide in Europe regarding the distribution of IPTV services?
2. Is there a digital divide in Europe regarding the consumption of IPTV services?
3. Is there a digital divide in Europe regarding expenditures for IPTV services?

Research hypothesis – In order to answer the research question, the following hypotheses were formulated:

1. No difference will be found between European members of the EU and European non-members of the EU regarding whatever is related to providing IPTV services.

2. No difference will be found between European members of the EU and European non-members of the EU regarding whatever is related to subscriber connections to IPTV services.

3. No difference will be found between European members of the EU and European non-members of the EU regarding whatever is related to consumer expenditures on IPTV services.

Data collection and research method – In order to answer the research questions, a secondary statistical analysis was performed on data published in 2011 by the European Audiovisual Observatory in a series of yearbooks, including: *Yearbooks 2011: Television and On-Demand Audiovisual Services in Europe*. The relevant data for this study were presented in relation to 37 European countries: a) 27 nation states that were members of the EU when the study was conducted (hence referred to as EUR27); b) 10 nation states that were not members of the EU when the study was conducted (hence referred to as EUR10).² All data are presented in thousands.


Setting variables – Based on the European Audiovisual Observatory data, the following variables were defined: EUR27 households ($M=9614.7619$; $SD=11074.59026$); TV households in the EU27 ($M=9342.7619$; $SD=10676.62121$); IPTV households in the EU27 ($M=615.0000$; $SD=1127.17013$); Pay IPTV households in the EU27 ($M=536.0952$; $SD=751.88090$); EUR10 households ($M=10791.7778$; $SD=22295.00970$); TV households in the EU10 ($M=10351.5556$; $SD=21223.00274$); IPTV households in the EU10 ($M=271.7500$; $SD=224.03032$); Pay IPTV households in the EU10 ($M=162.0000$; $SD=173.17140$).

4. Findings

Service providers

According to data from the European Audiovisual Observatory as published in the 2011 yearbooks, in 2010, 74 IPTV service providers were active all over Europe. As can be seen from Figure 1, the number of service providers in EU countries was 1.6 times larger than those active in the rest of the European countries.

Figure 1. European IPTV operators in 2010.



Therefore, it can be determined that there is a significant gap causing inequality between EU members and European non-member countries with regard to IPTV service providers.

Household subscribers

According to data from the European Audiovisual Observatory as published in the 2011 yearbooks, the number of EUR 27 subscriptions to IPTV services in 2010 was 11,079,200. The number of subscriptions to IPTV services in the EUR10 during 2010 was 1,595,200. All in all, the total IPTV subscriptions amounted to 12,676,400. The significance of this is that 5.28% of total EUR27 households subscribed to IPTV services while only 2.02% of total EUR27 households subscribed to such services. Moreover, the average growth rate of EUR27 IPTV subscribers, between 2006 and 2010, was 154%. At the same period, the average growth rate of EUR10 IPTV subscribers was 172%. This means that the growth rate of EUR10 IPTV subscribers was 111.5% higher than EUR27 IPTV subscribers. Table 1 presents the distribution of IPTV subscriptions in the EUR10 and the EUR27 for 2006–2010:

Table 1. Distribution of IPTV subscriptions in EUR10 and EUR27 – 2006–2010.

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
EUR 10 (97,126 householders)	N=198.8	N=401.1	N=688.8	N=1,098.4	N=1,597.3
EUR 27 (209,981 householders)	N=2,066.1	N=3,993.6	N=6,203.3	N=8,606.3	N=11,078.4
EUR 37 (2,843 householders)	N=2,256.9	N=4,394.7	N=6,892.1	N=9,704.7	N=12,676.7

* All numbers are in thousands

* The number of householders in 2010

Table 1 indicates that throughout the period being researched, the number of subscribers to IPTV services was larger in the EUR27 nations than in the EUR10 nations. However, an examination of the relative growth rates of assimilation percentages of IPTV services reveals a different picture.

Figure 2 presents the relative growth rates of assimilation percentages of IPTV services for the EUR10 and the EUR27 between the years 2006 – 2010:

Figure 2. Growth rate of IPTV subscriptions in the EUR10 for 2006–2010.




Figure 2 indicates that during the entire period being researched, the growth rate of subscribers to IPTV services was larger for the EUR10 than that for the EUR27.

The EUR27 – A t-test³ for paired samples was performed in order to examine the assumption that there was a significant difference between IPTV households for 2006 and IPTV households for 2007. Results show that the number of IPTV households for 2007 ($M=147.7992$, $SD=369.7331$) was significantly higher than IPTV households for 2006 ($M=76.7307$, $SD=203.1814$) ($t(25)=-2.2126$, $p<.05$); A t-test for paired samples was performed in order to examine the assumption that there was a significant difference between IPTV households for 2007 and IPTV households for 2008. Results show that the number of IPTV households for 2008 ($M=232.5884$, $SD=444.7440$) was significantly higher than IPTV households for 2007 ($M=147.7992$, $SD=369.7331$) ($t(25)=-4.072$, $p<.05$); A t-test for paired samples was performed in order to examine the assumption that there was a significant difference between IPTV households for 2008 and IPTV households for 2009. Results show that IPTV households for 2009 were significantly higher ($M=326.3538$, $SD=568.1344$) than IPTV households for 2008 ($M=232.5884$, $SD=444.7440$) ($t(25)=-3.405$, $p<.05$); A t-test for paired samples was performed in order to examine the assumption that there was a significant difference between IPTV households for 2009 and IPTV households for 2010. Results show that IPTV households for 2010 ($M=425.8884$, $SD=705.6968$) were significantly higher than IPTV households for 2009 ($M=326.3538$, $SD=568.1344$) ($t(25)=-3.312$, $p<.05$); Therefore, it can be determined that there was a continuous growth trend in the number of IPTV households in the EUR 27 during the years 2006-2010.

France led the EUR27 with 3,512,600 subscribers to IPTV in 2010 (13% of total French householders) followed by Germany (with 1,264,000 subscribers, 3.2% of total German householders) and Italy (with 686,000 subscribers, 2.8% of total Italian householders).

Table 2. Distribution of IPTV subscriptions in the EUR 27 for 2006–2010.

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Austria (3,268 householders)	N=4.0	N=20.9	N=63.7	N=101.3	N=154.3
Belgium (4,622 householders)	N=139.7	N=305.3	N=441.0	N=652.0	N=839.0
Bulgaria (2,843 householders)	N=0.6	N=0.7	N=1.4	N=4.2	N=7.5
Cyprus (284 householders)	N=18.0	N=39.4	N=52.0	N=62.0	N=50.0
Czech Republic (4,423 householders)	N=16.1	N=84.4	N=146.6	N=171.1	N=169.9
Denmark (2,847 householders)	N=7.9	N=34.8	N=83.8	N=196.2	N=248.0
Estonia (553 householders)	N=26.1	N=54.0	N=75.0	N=97.0	N=128
Finland (2,756 householders)	N=3.0	N=6.4	N=14.9	N=28.4	N=47.9
France (28,088 householders)	N=977.3	N=1,857.8	N=2,211.5	N=2825.7	N=3512.6

Germany (39,617 householders)	N=24.0	N=234.0	N=435	N=868.5	N=1,264.0
Greece (4,357 householders)	N=0.0	N=27.0	N=80.2	N=130.0	N=217.0
Hungary (3,785 householders)	N=1.4	N=6.4	N=36.3	N=83.5	N=151.0
Ireland (1,666 householders)	N=9.5	N=9.5	N=10.0	N=11.0	N=17.0
Italy (21,883 householders)	N=213.0	N=263.0	N=587.1	N=675.0	N=686.0
Latvia (857 householders)	N=0.5	N=7.2	N=17.6	N=43.6	N=118.1
Lithuania (1,389 householders)	N=6.0	N=18.5	N=41.1	N=57.8	N=70.7
Luxembourg (205 householders)	N=0.0	N=0.2	N=2.9	N=9.0	N=11.0
Malta (139 householders)	N=0.0	N=0.0	N=0.0	N=0.0	N=0.0
Netherlands (7,366 householders)	N=57.5	N=110.5	N=154	N=242.2	N=454.0
Poland (13,319 householders)	N=4.7	N=47.3	N=78.1	N=151.1	N=181.4
Portugal (3,942 householders)	N=0.6	N=26.2	N=171.7	N=372.8	N=617.1
Romania (7,402 householders)	N=0.2	N=0.4	N=0.5	N=2.6	N=32.9
Slovak Republic (1,754 householders)	N=0.9	N=17.0	N=50.1	N=88.9	N=117.0
Slovenia (807 householders)	N=28.6	N=71.1	N=136.5	N=179.0	N=198.6
Spain (17,172 householders)	N=395.4	N=555.4	N=683	N=775.61	N=847.9
Sweden (42,444 householders)	N=81.1	N=205.8	N=276.0	N=353.8	N=430.5
United Kingdom (27,030 householders)	N=50.0	N=90.4	N=344.3	N=427.6	N=507.9
Total (209,981 householders)	N=2,066.1	N=3,993.6	N=6,203.3	N=8,606.3	N=11,079.4


* All numbers are in thousands;

* The number of householders in 2010

Table 2 indicates that despite the relative advantage of Germany as compared to the rest of the European nations, France was the leader in the number of households subscribing to IPTV services. In addition, it is possible to see that in countries with the smallest number of households, the assimilation of IPTV was the lowest (if it existed at all). However, an analy-

sis of the growth rate of IPTV services between the years 2006–2008 presents a more complex picture.


Figure 3. Growth rate of IPTV subscriptions in the EUR27 for 2006–2010.



From Figure 3 it appears that differences existed in the growth rate of EU nations. Compared to Portugal, for example, where the highest assimilation rate of IPTV services took place in 2006–2007, it may be seen that in Romania this took place in 2009–2010. This indicates that in everything related to IPTV services, the digital divide is flexible and changeable.

At this stage a comparison was made between the average growth rates of IPTV service assimilation, a comparison that exemplifies in a more striking way the flexibility of IPTV service assimilation.

Figure 4. Average growth rate of IPTV subscriptions in the EUR27 – 2006–2010.



The EUR10 – A t-test for paired samples was performed in order to examine the assumption that there is a significant difference between the number of IPTV households for 2006 and that for 2007. Results show that the number of IPTV households for 2007 was NOT significantly higher than IPTV households for 2006 ($p > .05$); A t-test for paired samples was per-

formed in order to examine the assumption that there was a significant difference between IPTV households for 2007 and IPTV households for 2008. Results show that IPTV households for 2008 ($M=140.8000$, $SD=127.6542$) were significantly higher than IPTV households for 2007 ($M=91.1500$, $SD=91.2664$) ($t(5)=-2.841$, $p<.05$); A t-test for paired samples was performed in order to examine the assumption that there was a significant difference between IPTV households for 2008 and IPTV households for 2009. Results show that IPTV households for 2009 were significantly higher ($M=203.2500$, $SD=166.4323$) than IPTV households for 2008 ($M=140.8000$, $SD=127.6542$) ($t(5)=-3.132$, $p<.05$); A t-test for paired samples was performed in order to examine the assumption that there was a significant difference between IPTV households for 2009 and IPTV households for 2010. Results show that IPTV households for 2010 ($M=246.9333$, $SD=166.4323$) were significantly higher than IPTV households for 2009 ($M=203.2500$, $SD=166.4323$) ($t(25)=-4.092$, $p<.05$); Therefore, it can be determined that there was a continuous growth trend in the number of IPTV households in the EUR 10 for the years 2007-2010.

The Russian Federation led the EUR 10 with 500,000 subscribers in 2010 (0.7% of total Russian Federation householders), followed by Switzerland (with 424,200 subscribers, 12.5% of total Swiss householders) and Croatia (343,000 subscribers, 21.0% of total Croatian householders).

Table 3. Distribution of IPTV subscriptions in the EUR10 for 2006–2010.


	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Albania (742 householders)	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1,165 householders)	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0
Croatia (1,635 householders)	N=9.0	N=46.0	N=124.0	N=249.0	N=343.0
Island (122 householders)	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0
Norway (4,920 householders)	N=76.5	N=105.8	N=147.8	N=203.4	N=246.1
Russian Federation (68,050 householders)	N=95.3	N=189.3	N=295.0	N=379.0	N=500.0
Switzerland (3,399 householders)	N=10.0	N=60.0	N=120.0	N=232.7	N=424.2
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (507 householders)	N=0	N=0	N=2.0	N=14.2	N=64.0
Turkey (4,920 householders)	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=2.1	N=6
Total (97,126 householders)	N=190.8	N=401.1	N=688.8	N=1098.4	N=1597.3

All numbers are in thousands

The number of householders in 2010

Table 3 indicates that for the years 2006-2007, Norway led the rest of the EUR10 nations, with the highest assimilation percentages of IPTV services. Conversely, for 2008-2010, Croatia led the other EUR10 nations, with the highest percentages. This indicates that in everything related to IPTV service subscriptions, the digital divide is flexible and changeable. Furthermore, an examination of the growth rate of IPTV service assimilation illustrates even more clearly the flexibility of this phenomenon.

Figure 5. Growth rate of IPTV subscriptions in the EUR10 for 2006–2010.



From Figure 5 it again appears that differences existed in the growth rate of different EU nations. Compared to former Yugoslavia, where the assimilation rate of IPTV services was the highest for 2008-2009, in Turkey it was the highest for 2009-2010. In addition, the most striking finding from the comparison between the growth rate of IPTV services for the EUR 27 nations and the EUR 10 nations was the number of nations among which there was a clear digital divide in the EUR 10: Iceland, Bosnia and Albania, approximately 30% of the block of nations, as opposed to the number of nations in which the digital divide existed in the EUR 27: Malta only, 3.7% of the EUR 27 nations.


In order to examine the differences between the growth rates of EUR27 IPTV households compared with EUR10 (non-EU-member) IPTV households, one-way ANOVA tests were performed. Results show that there were no significant differences between the growth rates of the EUR27 IPTV households compared with the EUR10 (non-EU-member) IPTV households for 2006-2007, 2008-2009 and 2000-2010 ($P > 0.05$). However, a significant deference was found in the growth rate for 2007-2008 ($t(34) = 2.109$, $p < .05$). During this period, the average growth rate of the EUR27 IPTV households ($M = 2.746$, $SD = 2.718$) was higher than that of the EUR10 (non-EU-member) IPTV households ($M = 0.7769$, $SD = 1.0008$).

To sum up thus far, due to the complexity of the results presented above, it is difficult to determine whether there is a significant difference between European members of the EU and European non-members of the EU in whatever is related to IPTV services. On the one hand, the growth rate of IPTV subscriptions in European nations that are not EU members (the EUR10 nations) is significantly higher than the growth rate of IPTV subscriptions in the EU nations (EUR27). However, on the other hand, it seems that the differences in absorption rate of IPTV are more related to the behavior patterns of each European nation than whether or not they belong to the Euro bloc.

Consumer Expenditures


According to data from the European Audiovisual Observatory as published in the 2011 yearbooks, consumer expenditures for IPTV audiovisual service in all 37 European states were 3,140.40m, an increase of 1.4 times compared to the previous year and 2.1 times compared to two years previously. Figure 6 presents the growth rates in householder expenditures for European IPTV services.

Figure 6. Consumer expenditures on IPTV services for 2006–2010.



Although the figure indicates the superiority of the EU over the rest of the European nations, the picture regarding consumer expenditures on IPTV services changes when the growth rates for consumer expenditures on these services are examined. Figure 7 presents the relative expenditures on IPTV services in Europe.

Figure 7. Growth rate of consumers' expenditures on IPTV services 2006–2010.



This figure indicates that the relative growth rate for consumer expenditures on IPTV services in the EU nations constantly decreased during the entire research period. Conversely, the relative growth rate for consumer expenditure on IPTV services decreased during 2006–2009 in nations that were not EU members, but began increasing a year later.

To sum up, the research hypothesis stating that no difference would be found between EU member states and non-member states in whatever is related to consumer expenditures on IPTV services was not confirmed. However, this appears to be a many-faceted phenomenon:

Firstly, consumers residing in EUR10 nations spent larger sums on IPTV services. Secondly, over the years there has been an increase in expenditures on IPTV services on the part of consumers both in EU member and non-member states. Thirdly, starting from 2008, there was a turning point in growth rates of consumer expenditures on IPTV, while those of non-member states exceeded those of member states.

5. Discussion

The IPTV market in Europe is dominated by Western European countries such as France, Germany, Spain and Belgium. This being the case, the assimilation of IPTV services constitutes an indication of the position of a society on the digital spectrum. Following are some matters having practical significance and a number of theoretical implications.

Practical significance – One can identify a number of practical explanations for the non-uniform implementation of IPTV: **A)** It seems that countries that have not been so quick to adopt advanced communications technologies and have joined the race for IT relatively late are nevertheless willing to invest in developing advanced media policy, which will eventually lead to their adopting more current communication technologies. In other words, many countries already have strong broadcasting ecosystems in which major pay-TV operators offer a wide variety of content. In France, however, it was only in 2005 that pay TV over digital networks began providing a more extensive choice (Andres, 2012); **B)** Regarding content packaging and search engines, successful implementation of IPTV is also associated with successful marketing tailored to local market needs and friendly search engines. French operators, for example, have in recent years, focused on the provision of foreign channels, either individually or in mini-packages, such as the „Great Wall Package” of Chinese channels or the „Arabesque” package of Arab channels offered by Free. In this respect, IPTV provides access to services that were previously only available via satellite, in addition to channels from Europe and the rest of the world (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2011); **C)** A relatively slow adoption of IPTV is due in part to the challenges of gaining a foothold in the face of a range of well-established competing digital platforms (Andres, 2012); **D)** As part of the IPTV value chain, different main actors in various sectors have become players in the IPTV value chain, namely, Telecom operators, Cable TV operators, Telecom equipment suppliers, Middleware software providers, advertising agencies and, finally, consumers. In this value chain, Telecom operators have a significant advantage because they are the owners of the data transmission network, including infrastructure and systems of monitoring, sending and receiving data, billing and maintaining relationships with consumers. However, today opportunities have presented themselves for IPTV content providers to serve niche market such as sports, technology and so on, especially due to the fact that the Internet is inundated by social networks according to which each user is connected to a specific interest group (Murer, 2008).

Theoretical implications – Performing a comparative examination of the penetration of IPTV services into European nations has yielded the following insights: *Firstly*, the results of the present study support previous claims, according to which economic and social inequality lead to a digital divide (Neckerman, 2004). However, the concept of digital divide does not indicate a rigid and unchanging reality. Quite the opposite: it is both changing and flexible. Indeed, for the time span during which the present study examined the penetration

rates of IPTV services, it is possible to identify dramatic changes over the years. In so doing, results of the present research support the findings of previous studies relating to the digital divide as a multi-dimensional and dynamic phenomenon (Norris, 2003; Randolph Leigh 2011). Furthermore, it appears that planned policy is likely to contribute to bridging the digital gaps among the European nations in everything related to assimilating broadband internet (Chadwick & Howard, 2009).

Secondly, despite what was stated above, the fact that in a number of European states IPTV technology has not been adopted attests to the fact that access to information technology must not be taken for granted and is not merely a result of circumstance. Furthermore, it is obvious that if steps are not taken to bridge the gap among Central European nations and Eastern or Southern European nations, Europe will find itself facing complex social, economic and political problems. Conversely, the existence of the digital divide is not a determinist phenomenon (Van Dijk, 2000), but a reality that is the result of a clear policy and the investment of effort and resources (James, 2013). Therefore, even if the basic digital divide shrinks gradually over time, it is naive to believe that the virtual world can overturn the fundamental inequalities of social stratification which are endemic throughout post-industrial societies, nor is it likely to overcome world poverty (Sassi, 2005).

Thirdly, overuse of the concept “digital divide” has opened the door to such a wide variety of phenomena and behaviors that it is difficult to comprehend it totally. At the same time, undoubtedly this is a binary phenomenon involving those who have access to technology and those who do not (Gunkel, 2003). On the European continent in general the binary approach isn’t so absolute; however it is definitely possible to identify the advantages of EU member states (apart from Malta) in gaining access to IPTV services, compared to non-member states. This is especially blatant regarding post-Socialist states, which are apparently still having difficulty coping with the development and distribution of information technology, so that to a large extent they preserve the differences between information-rich and information-poor states. In various post-Socialist countries, the focus is generally on developing universal access to public places (Vartanova, 2002). Thus, although European Union leaders emphasize problems of exclusion from the knowledge economy (Norris, 2003), not all EU members can boast affluent, advanced economies with rapid growth rates of IPTV services.

To sum up, new media technologies and services are being developed as a result of the spread of digital networks and software platforms. The uneven distribution of the new media (the “digital divide”) and its consequences are a potential threat to those citizens who, for one reason or another, are not participating in electronically-mediated networks (Mansell, 2002). This is particularly true since the new IPTV and Web TV broadband infrastructure is the first meaningful effort to resolve the digital divide (Gunn, 2007). If so, nations that are not investing in developing IPTV services in Europe and elsewhere will find themselves enlarging the digital divide between themselves and the developed nations, and will lag behind.

Notes

¹ For further information, see: ipTVnews: http://archive.iptv-news.com/iptv_news/january_2012/global_iptv_subscribers_to_more_than_double_by_end-2016.

² Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Island, Norway, Russian Federation, Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey.

³ The t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are *statistically different* from each other. This analysis is appropriate whenever one wants to compare the means of two groups. Thus it can be used to determine if two sets of data are significantly different from one other.

References

1. Andres, R. (2012). Why France leads the IPTV world – but isn't winning the race. Retrieved, April 28th, 2013, from <http://paidcontent.org/2012/12/18/why-france-leads-the-iptv-world-but-isnt-winning-the-race/>
2. Bauer, V. (2008). "Regionalizing E-Inclusion approaches of the EU and Austria. In W. Benedek, V. Bauer & M. Kettelman (Eds.). *Internet Governance and the Information Society* (pp. 115-126). Utrecht, The Netherlands: Eleven, International Publishing.
3. Blasco-Arcas, L., Aznar-Baranda J.I., Herná'ndez-Orteg B., & Ruiz-Mas, J. (2011). IPTV as a services distribution channel. *Industrial Management & Data Systems*. 111(9), 1381-1398.
4. Chadwick, A., & Howard, P. N. (2009). *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
5. Christophers, B. (2008). Television's Power Relations in the Transition to Digital: The Case of the United Kingdom. *Television New Media*. 9(3), 239-257.
6. Cunningham, S. (2012). Emergent Innovation through the Coevolution of Informal and Formal Media Economies. *Television & New Media*. 13(5), 415-430.
7. Dulal, H. K., Jin K., Lee J. Y., & Kim, K. J. (2012). Impacts of cognitive media attributes and motivation on IPTV adoption: exploring the moderating effects of agricultural information. *Information Development*. 28(4), 300-315.
8. European Audiovisual Observatory. (2011). *Yearbooks 2011: Television and On-Demand Audiovisual Services in Europe*. Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory.
9. Gunkel, D. J. (2003). Second Thoughts: Toward a Critique of the Digital Divide. *New Media & Society*. 5(4), 499-522.
10. Gunn, H. J. (2007). *The Basics of IPTV*. Chicago, Illinois, USA: International Engineering Consortium.
11. Hopper, P. (2007). *Understanding Cultural Globalization*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
12. Iosifidis, P. (2006). Digital Switchover in Europe. *International Communication Gazette*. 68(3), 249-268.
13. James, J. (2008). Digital Divide Complacency: Misconceptions and Dangers. *The Information Society: An International Journal*. 24(1), 54-61.
14. James, J. (2013). *Digital Relationships in Developing Countries: An economic perspective*. New York, NY: Routledge.
15. Kawamori, M. (2010). *ITU-T IPTV-Global Standards Initiative TSR Coordinator; ITU/EBU Workshop Accessibility to Broadcasting and PTV ACCESS for ALL, 23-24 November 2010*. Retrieved, January 1th, 2013, from http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/06/42/T06420000010031PDFE.pdf
16. Kettelman, M. C. (2008). E-Inclusion as a means to bridge the digital divide: conceptual issues and international approaches. In W. Benedek, V. Bauer & M. Kettelman (Eds.). *Internet Governance and the Information Society* (pp. 51-62). Utrecht, The Netherlands: Eleven, International Publishing.
17. Kim, P. (2009). Internet Protocol TV in Perspective: A Matrix of Continuity and Innovation. *Television & New Media*. 10(6), 536-545.
18. Koleyni, G. (2006). *ITU-T Focus Group on Internet Protocol Television (FG IPTV)*. Seoul, Korea: International Telecommunication Union.
19. Leibovitch, E. (2003). *Commentary: Open source software bridging the technology gap*. BNET. Retrieved, January 1th, 2013, from <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi MOBRZ/is /ai 103731255>.
20. Lengsfeld, J.H.B. (2011). An Econometric Analysis of the Sociodemographic Topology of the Digital Divide in Europe. *The Information Society: An International Journal*. 27(3), 141-157.

21. Mansell, R. (2002). From Digital Divides to Digital Entitlements in Knowledge Societies. *Current Sociology*. 50(3), 407-426.
22. Murer, R. (2008). The IPTV value chain. Retrieved, April 28th, 2013, from <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/22034337/The-IPTV-Value-Chain>
23. Montpetit, M. J., Klym N., & Mirlacher, T. (2011). The future of IPTV Connected, mobile, personal and social. *Multimedia Tools and Applications*. 53(3), 519-532.
24. Neckerman, K. M. (2004). *Social Inequality*. New York, MY: Russell Sage Foundation
25. Norris, P. (2003). *Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide*. New York. NY: Cambridge University Press.
26. O'Driscoll, G. (2008). *Next Generation IPTV Services and Technologies*. New Jersey, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
27. Ortiz, J. A. (2008). *The Perceived Impact of Municipal Wireless Broadband Networks on the Digital Divide: A Tale of Five Cities*. Retrieved January 10th, 2013, from http://books.google.co.il/books?id=tH6YRenJhEwC&pg=PA236&dq=Digital+Divide+broadband&hl=iw&sa=X&ei=OQTvUI-HE_KP4gSz14HACg&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Digital%20Divide%20broadband&f=false
28. Parayil, G. (2005). The Digital Divide and Increasing Returns: Contradictions of Informational Capitalism. *The Information Society: An International Journal*. 21 (1), 41-51.
29. Pfeffer, P. (2006). IPTV: Technology and Development Predictions. *Fiber and Integrated Optics*. 25(5), 325-346.
30. Randolph L. P. (2011). *International Exploration of Technology Equity and the Digital Divide*. Hershey, PA.: Information Science Reference, IGI Global.
31. Robinson, L. (2011). Information-channel preferences and information-opportunity structures. *Information Communication & Society*. 14(4), 472-494.
32. Sassi, S. (2005). Cultural differentiation or social segregation? Four approaches to the digital divide. *New Media & Society*. 7(5), 684-700.
33. Shin, D. H. (2007). Socio-technical analysis of IPTV: A case study of Korean IPTV. *Info*. 9(1), 65-79.
34. Stevenson, S. (2009). Digital Divide: A Discursive Move Away from the Real Inequities. *The Information Society*. 25(1), 12-22.
35. Strover, S. (2003). Remapping the Digital Divide. *The Information Society: An International Journal*. 19(4), 275-277.
36. Trebing, H. (2004). Assessing deregulation: The clash between promise and reality. *Journal of Economic Issues*. 38(1), 1-28.
37. Van Dijk, J., & Hacker, K. (2003). The Digital Divide as a Complex and Dynamic Phenomenon. *The Information Society: An International Journal*. 19(4), 315-326.
38. Van Dijk, J. (2000). Widening information gaps and policies of prevention. In K. Hacker & J. Van Dijk (Eds.). *Digital democracy: Issues of theory and practice*. (pp. 166-183). London: Sage Publications.
39. Vartanova, E. (2002). Digital Divide and the Changing Political/Media Environment of Post-Socialist Europe. *International Communication Gazette*. 64(5), 449-465.
40. Vehovar, V., Sicherl P., Hüsing T., & Dolnicar V. (2006). Methodological Challenges of Digital Divide Measurements. *The Information Society: An International Journal*. 22(5), 279-290.
41. Warschauer, M. (2011). *Digital Divide – Encyclopedia of Library and Information Sciences, Third Edition*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.

Mădălina BOTAN*

Different types of conflict in the news and their impact on political trust: the cumulated effect of incivility and intrusiveness

Abstract

This study focuses on the differential impact of the types of conflicts covered in the news. The experiment discussed here examines the effects of conflict-oriented news frames on political trust over which previous studies have provided inconsistent findings. Findings do not support a general negative impact of conflict-oriented frames but demonstrate a cumulative effect of intrusiveness and incivility. While conflicts about unobtrusive topics framed in a civilized manner do not have a negative impact on political trust, conflicts related to obtrusive topics framed in an uncivil manner significantly contribute to the decrease of political trust.

Keywords: conflict frames; political trust; incivility; news media.

1. Introduction

When framed in a conflict-oriented manner, the information related to politics offers a distorted understanding of the political process and creates confusing representations of political leaders. Given the prevalence of the conflicts in the political news, this study aims to investigate how political conflicts presented in the news impact on citizens' political evaluations. This topic has not been systematically approached within the field of communication studies. A wide range of research, carried out outside the field of communication, suggests the fact that the individuals react differently to conflicts (Gallego & Oberski, 2011). Their differential responses to political conflicts are paramount because they can be translated into political attitudes and behaviors. Political behaviors are usually doubled by an adequate attitudinal support, and the vast majority of the empirical data validates political trust as being one of the most important components of the contemporary democracies (Norris, 2000). Bearing this in mind as a starting point, the work presented in this paper aims to delineate the ambivalent relation between conflicts framed in the media and political trust.

As highlighted by some researchers, the journalistic emphasis on conflicts undermines the viewers' trust in their ability to engage in the political process (*cf.* Norris, 2003). Heavy emphasis on existing conflicts might also be responsible for the erosion of public trust in politicians and political institutions in general (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995), and also for the citizens' increasing political cynicism and apathy (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). There have also been voices to claim that conflict-oriented frames may also have positive impact,

* College of Communication and Public Relations, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania, madalina.botan@comunicare.ro.

if the viewers understand the real stake of the problems at issue and if they feel that they can become a part of the solution, that is if they trust they can change something by their political participation (Schuck & de Vreese, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2011).

The news is never confined only to present the facts but more often it implies using *frames* – i.e. means of journalistic packaging –, which suggest how the presented information should be interpreted (*cf.* Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gans, 1979/ 2004). When recounting the political events, the journalists can choose either a *factual frame* or a *conflict-oriented frame* (Gross & Brewer, 2007: 122). The former focuses on the consequences of the narrated facts – e.g. how efficient the proposed measures are, whom they might affect, who may be the beneficiary thereof, etc. –, the latter highlights the frictions and the strategies developed by the various parties involved, and who usually have a stake in the presented issue. The conflict frames capture, for instance, various parliamentary maneuvers, disagreements between parties and quarrels between politicians.

Only recently has there been an increasing interest to research the effects of the conflict-oriented news frames. Notwithstanding, the existing literature looks almost exclusively into the impact that conflict frames have on voter turnout (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Kahn & Kenny, 1999; Mutz, 2002; Min, 2004) and, even less, into the impact they have on the trust in political institutions (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). While acknowledging the great importance of such results, it can be claimed that no research has so far managed to prove if different types of conflicts in the news have different effects and if they are or can be strongly correlated with political trust.

Since a focus on conflicts and disagreements cannot and will not put forward the image of neither some functional and efficient political institutions nor some politicians who have at heart the public welfare, we can extrapolate and presume that conflict-oriented political frames have a negative effect on political trust. For example, the relation between cynicism and strategy news frames, which lay a heavy emphasis on the tactics and strategies underpinning the political decisions, has already been established (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; de Vreese, 2005). Without minimizing the value of such contributions, it is, nonetheless, paramount to proceed to a more fine-grained analysis of the relationship between the different types of conflicts framed in the news and political trust.

The conflicts may vary depending on the topic and the manner in which they are framed, and our assumption is that the audience members are likely to respond differently to such variations. There is consistent evidence that people distinguish between useful negative information presented in an appropriate manner and a certain type of illegitimate negative information, which implies harsh mudslinging (Kahn & Kenny, 1999). A more nuanced differentiation of conflicts is therefore needed in order to better understand their role in building up or, on the contrary, eroding political trust.

One of the main goals of this research is to offer a conceptual clarification of the conflict frames portrayed in the news and to advance an experimental design which could potentially isolate their effects on political trust. This study aims to identify and classify such effects and I have grounded my approach on the idea that the manner in which a conflict is portrayed in the news does not have a steady effect on the audience. Depending on the style in which they are formulated and the topic around which they are built up, conflict-oriented news frames may lead to different reactions. In other words, it may be the case that only some types of conflict frames lower political trust, while others may have the opposite effect.

Several studies have shown that political criticism formulated in a civil manner has a different effect from the uncivil attacks. Various empirical findings (Geer, 2006; Kahn & Kenny, 1999; Mutz & Reeves, 2005) validate the hypothesis according to which civil conflicts have different effects from uncivil conflicts (which roughly refer to mere insults, irrelevant for the topics at issue), and it seems that they generate much more powerful reactions. More specifically, attacks framed in an uncivil manner trigger certain specific psychological mechanisms, such as conflict-aversion or – at the other end of the spectrum – the intentional pursuit of conflicts.

I propose, therefore, a more fine-grained distinction of conflicts according to their *topic* (conflicts with *obtrusive topic* and conflicts with *unobtrusive topic* which focus on aspects of low relevance for audience members) and their *style* (*civil conflicts* and *uncivil conflicts*). Such a classification of conflicts could prove useful in our attempt to delineate the impact of the *type* of conflicts framed in the news on political trust.

Summarizing, this research aims, first and foremost, to test whether a *conflict frame* has a different effect from a *substantive frame*, which does not lay emphasis on the conflicts between two or more opponents. Secondly, I aim to investigate if a) the *style* of conflict frames portrayed in the news (*civil conflicts* versus *uncivil conflicts* which usually include mudslinging) and b) the *topic* of the conflict (*obtrusive topics*, focused on issues of personal relevance versus *unobtrusive topics*, which are perceived to be of low relevance to audience members) have a differential impact on political trust.

2. Hypotheses

Conflict-oriented news frames are usually considered more unsubstantiated than substantive frames (Bennett, 2006), which present the facts, without emphasizing the antagonisms between the involved parties or the political tactics and maneuvers (Gross & Brewer, 2007). Having this said, one can anticipate the existence of some different effects of conflict frames from substantive frames. Given that they promote the image of some dysfunctional public institutions, it is somewhat predictable that the conflict-driven information will have damaging consequences. More specifically, since a focus on the existing conflicts in the political arena cannot offer the image of some cohesive and efficient political institutions, we expect that the conflicts framed in the news will have a negative effect on political trust.

H1: Conflict news frames will have a stronger negative impact on political trust than substantive news frames.

Information, which is conflict-oriented, seems to command greater attention on the part of the viewers. What is more, the manner in which political conflicts are framed may give rise to different reactions. Unprincipled controversies, based on unfounded attacks may induce psychological discomfort to the audience members (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995), and, hence, can decrease political trust. Consequently, I predict that framing political conflicts in a strident and uncivil manner will have a stronger negative impact on political trust than the civil framing of political disagreements.

Furthermore, the reactions of the audience may as well depend on the topic of the news; hence, the topic to have started off the conflict and implicitly its capacity to activate cognitively and emotionally the audience members could make a significant difference. The attitudes associated with obtrusive topics are more stable than the attitudes associated with

unobtrusive topics, which are deemed irrelevant to the self; the latter are not backed up by informational support and are therefore much more unstable. (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). A categorization of news, which is recurrent in the literature, distinguishes between obtrusive topics if the public has or has had direct experience with it, or unobtrusive if the public has had no direct contact with it (Iyengar, 2012; Iyengar, 1991). Topics such as inflation or unemployment rate are often quoted as examples of obtrusive topics, whereas topics related to external politics are considered unobtrusive.

Finally, I predict that the participants in the experiment are more interested in the topics that are perceived to have a direct impact on their own self and, therefore these topics attract their attention. The attention and interest factors will allow for a more thorough cognitive processing of the information. This kind of engagement in processing the information could lead to increasing the magnitude of the framing effects. Consequently, by correlating the two aforementioned variables, i.e. *conflict style* and *topic*, I propose the following hypothesis:

H2: Conflict news frames presented in an uncivil manner about obtrusive topics will negatively affect political trust to a larger extent than conflict frames put forward in a civil manner about unobtrusive topics.

3. Methodology

In order to test the proposed hypotheses, I have carried out an experiment. The advantage of the experimental design is that it allows the researcher to identify some valid interference effects in connection with the effects of the news frames (*cf.* Druckman & McDermott, 2008; Gross & Brewer, 2007; Iyengar, 1991; Valentino *et al.*, 2011). In the experiment took part six hundred and seventeen undergraduate students in the Faculty of Communication and Public Relations and in the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures (University of Bucharest)¹.

The main criticism, which can be connected to an experimental design, is related to the generalization of results at the level of the population as a whole. There is, however, increasing evidence that the differences between a student sample and a national sample are not that big (Nelson *et al.*, 1997) so as to not allow for generalizing the results. Moreover, we consider that the large number of participants allows us to extrapolate the results at the level of the entire young population in Romania.

The questionnaire used in the experiment was initially pre-tested and then applied in two universities (SNSPA and University of Bucharest). There have been no significant differences between the two groups of students. I built a 2x3 experiment, plus a control group, whose participants were not exposed to an experimental stimulus. Hence, 7 experimental conditions² were tested, out of which six consisted in news frames either conflict-oriented or neutral, both varying depending on a) the *topic* (*obtrusive* versus *unobtrusive* topic) and b) the *style* (*civil* versus *uncivil*). The two topics selected were the following: the increase by 50% of the tuition fees (obtrusive topic) and subsidies for agriculture (unobtrusive topic). Following the experimental design, we framed the news either a) in a neutral, factual manner or b) from a conflict-driven perspective, by bringing forth the oppositions between the involved parties³. Each participant was randomly assigned one of the seven types of questionnaires. An approximately even number of participants were available for each of the seven groups.

After reading the text, which constituted the experimental stimulus, the participants answered a set of questions on political trust. The scale for political trust was designed based

on operationalizing trust as shown in Schuck & de Vreese (2012), and it included six statements: “Politicians have good intentions”; “Politicians do not deserve respect”; “When making public statements, most of the politicians tell the truth”; “We can trust most of the politicians”; “Despite what many people think, the majority of the politicians try to honor their electoral promises”; “When making public statements, the majority of the politicians address the media”. Each variable was measured on a seven-point Likert scale of agreement, where 1 = “total disagreement” and 7 = “total agreement”. The internal consistency of the scale was measured using Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = 0.817$). Consequently, we got our variable as a result of the arithmetic mean of the six variables on the scales.

4. Analysis of the results

The first hypothesis of this research sought to demonstrate the correlation between conflict news frames, neutral frames and political trust. However, data from the experiment have not validated this hypothesis. Thus, I have differentiated, within the seven experimental groups, between conflict frames and neutral frames. The first cluster of data included the unobtrusive conflict frame, shaped in a civil manner, the unobtrusive conflict frame, shaped in an uncivil manner, as well as the civil obtrusive conflict frames and the uncivil obtrusive conflict frames, while the second cluster focusing on neutral frames included the control group and the two groups which were exposed to a factual, non-conflict-oriented news story, limited to presenting the aspects of a political decision, regardless of the topic. I have applied a T Test to check the differences in political trust, but the test result was non-significant. Building on this, I conclude that it is not the conflict *per se* to cause certain reactions, but rather the type of conflict. The manner in which the conflict is framed makes a difference in terms of the cognitive and attitudinal responses of the audience.

For a deeper and better understanding of the differential effects of certain types of conflicts, I have distinguished between civil political conflicts and uncivil ones. I have hypothesized that the effects of conflict frames portrayed in the news are not uniform and their magnitude may depend on a) conflict style – civil versus uncivil and b) conflict topic – obtrusive/unobtrusive.

During the first phase, conflict frames were selected and dissociation between the civil conflict frames and the uncivil ones was made, regardless of the topic – obtrusive or unobtrusive. The independent-samples T Test has revealed significant differences between the two groups regarding political trust – $T(347) = -2.25$, $p < 0.05$. By interpreting these data, one can argue that the subjects who have read a piece of news on an uncivil conflict displayed a significantly lower political trust ($M = 2.14$, $SD = 0.91$) than those who have been exposed to some news exchange phrased in a civil manner ($M = 2.38$, $SD = 1.05$) (On the political trust scale, the lower the value is, the lower is the trust).

In the attempt to isolate the different effects of the types of conflict frames portrayed in the news, a distinction between different conflict frames was made, depending on their topic, regardless of the style in which they were formulated (civil or uncivil). The distinction between obtrusive topics and unobtrusive topics has not resulted in significant differences in political trust. This fact has reinforced our prediction that there is only a *combined* effect of the type of *topic* and *style* in which a conflict is framed, hence confirming the second hypothesis of our research:

H2: Conflict news frames presented in an uncivil manner about obtrusive topics will negatively affect political trust to a larger extent than conflicts put forward in a civil manner about unobtrusive topics.

Next, I checked for each variable the differences between the experimental conditions in each group. In order to test the differences between the groups ANOVA was used; it has not revealed any statistically significant differences for any of the dependent variables. In spite of this, when analyzing the mean differences of the political trust intensity between the groups, there has been noticed that the extremes are always consistent: the group in the “obtrusive uncivil” condition and the group in the “unobtrusive civil” condition, respectively. Within the overall logic of the experimental design, the two-abovementioned conditions were precisely conceived as extremes from the beginning. The mean scores for each dependent variable and the standard deviations for each experimental condition are provided in the table below:

Table 1. The mean scores for political trust per experimental condition.

Experimental treatment	Political Trust	
	Mean	
Control group	Mean	2.3146
	N	89
	Std. Deviation	.93885
Intrusive conflict framed neutrally	Mean	2.2559
	N	85
	Std. Deviation	.91692
Intrusive conflict framed in a civilized manner	Mean	2.2762
	N	86
	Std. Deviation	1.07309
Intrusive conflict framed in an uncivilized manner	Mean	2.1235
	N	85
	Std. Deviation	.98397
Uncivil conflict framed neutrally	Mean	2.5000
	N	88
	Std. Deviation	.98041
Uncivil conflict about an obtrusive topic	Mean	2.4719
	N	89
	Std. Deviation	1.02417
Uncivil conflict about an unobtrusive topic	Mean	2.1545
	N	89
	Std. Deviation	.83215
Total	Mean	2.3007
	N	611
	Std. Deviation	.97104

The independent-samples T Test has revealed significant differences between the two groups regarding political trust – $T(172) = -2.28, p < 0.05$. In other words, the subjects who have been exposed to obtrusive uncivil conflicts display significantly lower levels of political trust ($M = 2.12, SD = 0.98$) than those exposed to unobtrusive civil conflicts ($M = 2.47, SD = 1.02$) (On the political trust scale, the lower the value is, the lower is the trust).

5. Discussion and conclusion

Many studies indicate that the disagreements and the conflicts among politicians promote the image of some dysfunctional institutions and that of some leaders who do not care about the public welfare (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). As an extension of such studies, our research points to the fact that not conflict *per se* has an effect on political trust but the way the media frames that conflict. Heavy emphasis in the news on conflicts framed in an uncivil manner, on an obtrusive topic for the members of the audience, can significantly lower political trust. However, the obtained data also point to another direction in terms of the influence of the conflict-driven frames: if conducted in a civil manner, conflicts may not necessarily have negative effects.

Hence, as an addendum to previous research, my data indicate a *differential effect* of conflicts. The differential effects reside in correlating the topic and the style of conflicts and they can be briefly summarized by means of the following statements:

- 1) News conflict frames do not have homogeneous effects. Only the combined effect of the conflict topic and style can have an impact on political trust.
- 2) Of all the conflict frames designed here, the extreme (in terms of negative impact) – obtrusive uncivil conflict frame – has had the highest impact on political trust.

The effects which we could isolate within the experimental design are somehow unexpected, on the one hand because of the transitory nature of the stimulus (a short newspaper story), and, on the other hand, due to the fact that trust is usually considered a stable feature, which does not display great fluctuations over time (Gross & Brewer, 2007). Sudden changes occur only in exceptional situations, such as in the case of extensive political scandals⁴. Therefore, the present study is indexical of a surprising flexibility of political trust. If merely reading a piece of news can induce a consistent change in terms of trusting the political institutions, it becomes clear that this feature is much more versatile than previously ascertained by specialized studies, and that the actual news – even more conflict-oriented and conflict-driven than the articles designed for the purpose of this experiment – have an even greater impact on political trust.

Generalizing the results (beyond the controlled experimental setting) at the level of the entire populations has also been a point of interest in our research. Given the large sample ($N=617$), we consider that we can extrapolate the results at the level of the entire young educated population in Romania. I have used the experimental stimuli as a realistic guise in order to test the dependent variable – political trust. Nonetheless, we would like to reinforce that the conflict-oriented load of the news stories used within the experimental conditions is much lower than the actual level of hostility transpiring in real world news.

Furthermore, I have also underlined another major constraint, which had to be taken into account in this research – newspaper stories were used as experimental stimuli and not videotaped news. A written story is undoubtedly significantly milder and less pervasive than a

videotaped story. A transcript of a news story eliminates the non-verbal and paralinguistic aspects, which intensify the conflict load of a certain situation; moreover, an uncivil exchange, as presented in a TV news frame, can never be rendered exactly as it has occurred in a written version – even if transcribed faithfully. Consequently, the impact on the audience is radically different. Under these circumstances, the intensity of the effects of conflict-oriented frames on political trust is even more surprising.

Aside from the issues related to the external validity of the data and, hence, their generalization, I believe nonetheless that an important step has been taken in the attempt to answer this essential question: “Do political conflicts, as framed in the news, affect and influence political trust?”. The theoretical introduction presented in this article shows that television intensifies the effects of incivility, and that a newspaper article, even if related to an aggressive controversy or dispute, cannot stir the same level of physiological stimulation as TV conflict-oriented political news. However, the data discussed here indicate a consistent effect on political trust. The combined effect of the *topic* (of greater or lower relevance to the audience) and the *style* of the conflicts (civil versus uncivil) portrayed in the news can be translated into an increased lack of trust in politicians.

Given the data of this research, a short answer to the question formulated at the beginning of this endeavor, i.e. “Do conflict frames portrayed in the news have any effects on political trust?” would be YES, but only when we deal with uncivil conflicts, which involve mudslinging.

There are several ways in which we can interpret and speculate on such data; what is clear, however, is that the types of conflicts in the news make a difference in terms of consequences on political trust. By refining the *video malaise* hypothesis (presented at length in the theoretical part), the current research demonstrated that *not any type of conflict frame has a negative impact*: only the exposure to uncivil conflicts lowers political trust. The *style* of the conflicts hence becomes paramount in terms of effects. The basic hypothesis of the study is therefore confirmed, the empirical data supporting the existence of a combined effect (the combined result of *topic* and *style*) of conflict frames portrayed in the news on political trust.

Notes

¹ Data showed no significant differences between the two categories of students, which is indicative of a relative homogeneity in terms of political knowledge, opinions and attitudes.

² The control group consisted of 90 subjects, whereas the 6 experimental groups included a relatively equal number of subjects (87 for the “obtrusive civil” condition, 87 for the “neutral civil” condition, 87 for the “obtrusive uncivil” condition, 89 for the “unobtrusive civil” condition, 89 for the “unobtrusive uncivil” condition, and 88 for the “neutral unobtrusive” condition).

³ The differences in the experimental conditions in the current research proved to be more subtle than those in other previous related experimental studies (e.g. Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). However, they were less subtle than those used in other studies (e.g. Gross & Brewer, 2007).

⁴ The example encountered in the literature is the Watergate scandal, when trust in president Nixon lowered considerably within a very short interval of time.

References

1. Bennett, L.W. (2006). *News: The Politics of Illusion*. 7th Edition. New York: Longman.
2. Brooks, D. J., & Geer, J. (2007). Beyond Negativity: The Effects of Incivility on the Electorate. *American Journal of Political Science*. 51 (1), 1–1
3. Cappella, J.A., & K.H. Jamieson. (1997). *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good*. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. de Vreese, Claes, H. (2005). *Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers.
5. Druckman, J., & McDermott, R. (2008). Emotion and the framing of risky choice. *Political Behavior*. 30. 297–321.
6. Gallego, A., & Oberski, D. (2011). Personality and Political Participation. *Political Behavior*. 43(2), 342–364.
7. Gamson, W., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. *American Journal of Sociology*. 95(1), 1–37.
8. Gans, H. (1979/2004). *Deciding What's News*. Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
9. Geer, J. G. (2006). *In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10. Gross, K., & Brewer, P. (2007). Sore Losers: News Frames, Policy Debates, and Emotions. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/ Politics*. 122(1). 122–133.
11. Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (1995). *Congress as Public Enemy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
12. Iyengar, S. (2012). Political Communication, (Ed.), *Political Communication*. (29) 4.
13. Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
14. Kahn, K.F., & Kenney, P.J. (1999). Do Negative Campaigns Mobilize or Suppress Turnout? Clarifying the Relationship between Negativity and Participation. *American Political Science Review*. 93, 877–89.
15. Krosnick, J. A., & Kinder, D. R. (1990). Altering the Foundations of Support for the President Through Priming. *The American Political Science Review*. 84(2), 497–512.
16. Min, Y. (2004). News coverage of negative political campaigns. An experiment of negative campaign effects on turnout and candidate preference. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. 9(4), 95–111.
17. Mutz, D.C. (2002). The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science*. 46: 838–855.
18. Nelson, T.E., Clawson, R.A., & Oxley, Z.M. (1997). Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effect on Tolerance. *American Political Science Review*. 91, 1055–1078.
19. Norris, P. (2003). Young People and Political Activism: From the Politics of Loyalties to the Politics of Choice? In *Council of Europe Symposium: Young People and Democratic Institutions: From Disillusionment to Participation*. Strasbourg.
20. Norris, P. (2000). *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post- Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
21. Schuck, A.R.T., & de Vreese, C.H. (2012). When good news is bad news: Explicating the moderated mediation dynamics behind the reversed mobilization effect. *Journal of Communication*. 62(1), 57–77.
22. Schuck, A.R.T., & de Vreese, C.H. (2011). Finding Europe: Mapping and Explaining Antecedents of “Europeanness” in News about the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. *Studies in Communication / Media (SCM)*. 1(2), 265–294.
23. Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., & Groenendyk, E. W. (2011) Election night’s alright for fighting: the role of emotions in political participation. *Journal of Politics*. 73(1): 156–170.

Varia

Alina Mihalcea*
Rodica Săvulescu**
Alexandra Vițelar***

Generation Y: between a civic and a cultural European identity

Abstract

The concept of European identity is not yet clearly defined, as there is little agreement on what constitutes it. Hence, the purpose of this article is to explore how Generation Y members perceive themselves as Europeans through user generated videos on the subject of European citizenship. The focus on Generation Y is motivated by the fact that its members have not experienced a divided Europe, but a unified one right from the beginning. We conducted a content analysis focused on discovering how young people use the civic and the cultural dimensions of European identity (Bruter, 2004) in order to construct their notion of Europeaness. The paper argues that Generation Y members employ both civic and cultural aspects, although their self-portrayals emphasize the utilitarian approach.

Keywords: Generation Y; European identity; civic; cultural; emotional; utilitarian.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to provide theoretical and empirical ground for discovering the way in which young people describe themselves as European. Over the past years there have been numerous attempts to define European identity, thus the theoretical and research background covering this subject is extensive. On the other hand, there is not much literature on the topic of European identity concerning the young generation. This constitutes an interesting interrogation as this demographic has been born in an already unified Europe, therefore being more prone to experiencing European identity on a deeper level. In this article, previous research is advanced in order to illustrate the young individuals' attitudes towards the European Union (for instance, Huyst, 2008, Moes, 2008, Sassatelli, 2009). These studies, however, highlight the fact that defining European identity is a difficult task for members of Generation Y. Hence, our interest was to identify the way in which Generation Y members describe themselves as European and whether they identify with the EU in a civic or a cultural manner.

Our article is structured in several sections that present, firstly, an overview of Generation Y, continuing with theoretical background on the concept of European identity and the

* PhD candidate, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania, alina.mihalcea@facultateademangement.ro.

** PhD candidate, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania, rodica.savulescu@comunicare.ro.

*** PhD candidate, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania, alexandra.vitelar@comunicare.ro.

Generation Y within the European context. All these theoretical concepts have a great importance for our research part, where we focused on the consumer generated videos on the subject of European identity. Thus, taking into account the dual perspective put forward by Bruter (2004, 2005), we conducted a content analysis in order to identify how young individuals build their sense of Europeanness, whether by employing civic or cultural elements.

2. Generation Y – an overview

This article is concerned with the way Generation Y members adopt a European identity and express it. The generational approach to the issue of European identity is supported by the claim that “the term «societal generations» refers to a group of people whose beliefs, attitudes or problems are homogenous. In many cases, the members of the group have undergone similar political, economic or cultural experiences within a certain period of time.” (Tremmel & Wegner, 2010, p. 81).

The concept of Generation Y was first used in the United States of America and describes a demographic cohort that follows that of Generation X – therefore, it represents the young people of today (born roughly between 1977 and 1999). When it comes to describing Generation Y, there is hardly one single vision on this subject. In fact, theories concerning the young people of today vary to such an extent that they almost contradict each other. In some cases, the approach is over-idealistic, proposing a generation that will change the world for the better, while in others it is overly-pessimistic and questions the capacity of these people to take care of themselves and become responsible adults.

Generation Y members are considered to be “digitally native” (Tapscott, 2009), “wired” (Sutherland & Thompson, 2003), “technologically-savvy” (Huntley, 2006). Their interaction with technology has important ramifications in all areas of their lives, as it helps young people stay in contact with each other and with the world at large. Following this line of thought, they have broader perspectives than previous generations: “Imagine a generation of kids who can live comfortably in more than one world, in more than one culture, with more than one language” (Sutherland & Thompson, 2003, p. 50). It is also believed that “the Millennial generation has begun to emerge as a powerful political and social force. They are smart, well educated, open-minded and independent” (Greenberg & Weber, 2008, p. 13). On the other hand, Twenge (2009, p. 399) considers that Generation Y members have narcissistic traits and an individualistic approach to life: “younger generations have been taught to believe, in short, that everything is within reach, self-belief is essential for success, and other people’s opinions are rarely important”. Due to its diverse characteristics, several authors suggest alternative names for this generation, such as “Nexters” (Zemke, Raines & Filipczak, 2000), “NetGeners” (Tapscott, 2009), “Millennials”, “Echo-Boomers”, “Thumb Generation” (Huntley, 2006), “MySpace Generation” (Rosen, 2007), “Generation We” (Greenberg & Weber, 2008), or Generation Me (Twenge, 2009). In a European acception, Generation Y has also been labeled “The Erasmus Generation” (Bennhold, 2005, Lominé, 2009) as a consequence of young people’s participation in the homonymous mobility program, or “The Generation of the 1,000 Euros” (Kretsos, 2010) – due to the economic crisis that largely affects the younger work force.

3. European identity – the many facets of the story

The understanding of the concept of identity involves a series of interpretations on how the individuals relate to certain social groups and on how they relate to the external environment. In the context of globalization, the major problem of individuals refers to the fact that they can choose from a multitude of identities that can match their interests and values and that can give them stability. In this sense, Bauman (2001) appreciates that the individuals tend to give up on their personal identity or on other type of identity that has been inherited or developed in time in different political, economic or social contexts. When it comes to the European Union, identity as a social construct is used for promoting security, peace, economic growth and values.

Identity has taken various forms based on social processes of inclusion and exclusion, through the dichotomy “them” vs. “we”. In the European context, the dichotomy “them” vs. “we” is a striking differentiation strategy that highlights historical cleavages, religious, cultural, political and economic differences at a continental level or between European countries. Europe represents “us” but also “them” (Strath, 2006). In this sense, on a discursive level, there are several categories of metaphors that emphasize this distinction, the container metaphor being the most relevant for demarcating the borders of in and out-groups (Tekin, 2010).

The concept of European identity can be analyzed from different points of view, taking into account the social component of identities (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1994; Hogg & Reid, 2006), the fact that European identity is implicitly a collective identity (Eder, 2009), that it is a part of the multiple identities held by individuals or political elites (Wodak, 2009; Risse & Grabowsky, 2008; Udrea & Corbu, 2010). The pluralist paradigm regarding civic vs. cultural components, starting with Bruter’s (2003, 2004) model of interpretation of European identity has been expressed under different forms. Several theories have described European identity as being integrational identity or civilizational identity (Eder, 2009), as having utilitarian (hard) or emotional (soft) components (Moes, 2008), or as having a normative and a cognitive level (Laffan, 2004). This article aims at exploring European identity by employing Bruter’s (2003, 2004, 2005) and Moes’ (2008) distinctions: civic vs. cultural, respectively, utilitarian vs. emotional in the case of members of Generation Y.

The civic identity refers to the identification with political institutions and with the rules and norms imposed by it, but it also provides the frame of reference for the rights of the citizens and also their responsibilities. The concept can be integrated to the “constitutional patriotism” elaborated by Habermas as a form of attachment of citizens towards political institutions through universally accepted democratic values, where “a political democracy does not need any identification with a peculiar historical or cultural identity” (Lacroix, 2002, p.946). Civic identity is characterized by elements like “prosperity, free movement, democracy and public policy” (Bruter, 2003, p.29), thus indicating that individuals see themselves as European citizens in terms of their awareness of belonging to the European political community in which the European institutions have a major role in ensuring the welfare of the society. At the bottom of the European integrational identity, the political and economic interests of the member states of the EU seem to prevail, while loyalty and support towards European institutions have only a pragmatic purpose. In this regard, the European community is seen as a social, political and economic model of differentiation.

Civic resources have an important role in the identification of the individuals with the European community and implicitly in the way that they perceive themselves as European cit-

izens. Therefore, when explaining European identity from a civic perspective, we must take into account the following civic resources: “citizens’ interest in and knowledge about the community’s matters; citizens’ mutual trust; citizens’ loyalty regarding the community, its leaders and its civic obligation resulting from being a member of the community in question and citizens’ readiness to show mutual solidarity on behalf of the group and fellow group members” (Karolewski & Kaina, 2012, p. 242). European identity formation is linked to the building of supranational institutions in Europe that fulfill political roles in order to accelerate the process of European integration. Institutionalization in Europe faces several challenges from the perspective of leaving behind the fundamentals of the nation-state that the member states of the European Union must face, the geopolitical interests and also the cultural differences that represent obstacles for the legitimization of European institutions and for the creation of a strong European community in terms of social, political and economic ties. In this case, European institutions can be interpreted as “identity builders” (Laffan, 2004) and at the same time are the elements that define Europe as a whole and as a social and political construct in terms of EU membership.

For Bruter (2003), European cultural identity, on the other hand, refers to the similarities between individuals and social groups that share a set of common values, a common culture or certain ethnic particularities. It refers to the cultural ties that link the member states of the EU through a common European culture by establishing clear boundaries between Europeans and “other” cultures and civilizations. Moes’ (2008, p. 7) approach to European identity provides an alternative term for the cultural dimension, calling it “emotional”: “a ‘softer’ form of European identification” that measures the individual’s emotional sense of belonging.

Elements that shape the cultural component of European identity are the similarities and cultural differences between Eastern and Western Europe (religion, literature, music, etc.) taking into account the lack of security and bloody history in Europe, that stand as a pillar for the European integration process and for ensuring peace in Europe (Inthorn, 2006). Culture is an important element of European identity and the individual’s perception upon the European integration process. This is more than evident in the case of Turkey’s accession to the European Union as a full member state: “Cultural identity becomes an unofficial accession criterion and the cultural concept of Europe becomes a discursive tool used in arguments against Turkish membership” (Inthorn, 2006, p.84). The case of Turkey is a conclusive example for the relevance of the cultural component of European identity and for the discursive construction of the dichotomy “them” vs. “us” at European level. This example clearly reflects that the EU is a sum of parts, or as Kamphausen (2006, p. 26) highlights there is no institution or anything else that can legitimately define itself as «more European than the others».

To conclude with, research in this field has demonstrated the prevalence of the civic component in shaping European identity of citizens (Lacroix, 2002; Mayer & Palmowski, 2004; Eder, 2009). Following this line of thought, Mayer & Palmowski (2004, p.575) state that “(...) the strongest identities that exist at a European level are legal and institutional, while a meaningful European historical identity barely exists”. Nevertheless, when discussing European cultural identity, Bruter (2004, 2005) highlights the fact that it exists, but it actually refers to Europe in general, not to the European Union as a construct. This might explain the results of studies (Bruter, 2005; Moes, 2008; Frunzaru & Corbu, 2011) that place greater emphasis on the civic component rather than the cultural one. Another argument in this regard would be the fact that a major role in the construction of European identity has been assigned to the European institutions through legal norms and the process of integration for the pur-

pose of the European states to be a part of Europe in a political, economic and social way, but at the same maintaining their national identity.

4. How European do young people feel?

When analyzing European identity, young people seem to be more attached to the concept than other demographics (Bennhold, 2005). In the following section, we intend to present the elements that characterize Generation Y members and might have an influence over their sense of Europeanness.

Therefore, in regard to Europe's Generation Y, there are noticeable fewer data available than in the case of American youth. There are both positive and negative aspects related to the young part of Europe's population: for one, it is considered to be more educated nowadays than in the past (Ostergren & Le Bossé, 2011). On the other hand, members of Generation Y seem to enter the labor force at a later stage in life probably due to an extension of their study period. The current socio-economic context is cited as a factor in this regard, as it affects the job market, rendering it "insecure, unpredictable and risky" and grouping the youth under names such as "The Precarious Generation" or "The Generation of the 1,000 Euros" (Kretsos, 2010, p. 3). When it comes to political participation, findings on Generation Y in Europe are consistent with research conducted in the US (Lewis, Inthorn & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2005), as they reveal the insignificance of young people's voices as compared to older age groups: "young people are at a disadvantage with regard to all dimensions of political participation" (Goerres, 2010, p. 215). Similarly, Bruter & Harrison (2009) show that European young citizens in particular fail to react or get involved in political activities.

Due to the East-West divide (Roberts, 2006), European members of Generation Y exhibit noticeable differences that might have an impact on the way they perceive themselves as having an European identity, as well. In regard to the latter, Ostergren and Le Bossé (2011, p. 228), affirm that "across most of the new post communist democracies there is a near universal desire to become a part of a new and integrated Europe, and a certain willingness- perhaps even stronger than in the West- for people to think of themselves first as Europeans". Nevertheless, youth in the newer European democracies might fall back in terms of critical thinking and independent acting, assuming responsibility for one's actions and actively engaging in the democratic process. For example, a study (Flanagan et al., 2006) on younger European democracies reveals the fact that more than half of young people in Bulgaria still rely on the state to meet their needs. After the breakup of the Socialist bloc, the emerging democracies faced a completely new context that "required abandonment of political principles and the attainment of totally unfamiliar political practices such as voting in free elections, assembling in public, protesting against government decisions, or simply discussing politics with one's neighbors without fear of reprisal" (Youniss & Yates, 2006, p. 3).

Several characteristics that describe today's European young people are offered by Carmen Leccardi (2006, p. 17): "the need to avoid long-term life projects, to elude fixity on favour of fluidity, to isolate the present as much from the past as from the future".

In the case of considering themselves European, it seems that childhood experiences and opportunities to initiate contact with Europe (such as the use of foreign languages, travel and school) are an important predictor, as Grundy & Jamieson (2007) point out. On the same note, the open borders which allow for student exchange programs are cited as an important

factor in the creation of a European identity among members of Generation Y. A recent study (Duczkovska-Piasecka & Mazurkiewicz, 2012) concerning Polish students concluded that the development of European identity among young people is possible through educational strategies created by the Union, such as exchange programmes (Erasmus or Leonardo da Vinci). The authors describe Generation Y members as “open-minded, they do not bear a grudge, do not believe in stereotypes, are keen on learning foreign languages and meeting various kinds of people, representing different nationalities, cultures and values” (Duczkovska-Piasecka & Mazurkiewicz, 2012, pp. 16-17). Also called the “Erasmus generation”, these young people are considered to develop multi-stratified identities and to become more attached to Europe due to this process of socialization: fifty-seven percent see their identity as having a „European dimension“ in the near future, while only 41 percent say their identity remains entirely national (Bennhold, 2005). This also leads to the idea of the possibility of a common European identity shared by Generation Y members. Following this line of thought, Lutz, Kritzinger & Skirbekk (2006) show that younger Europeans are more likely than older groups to have multiple identities – that is, to develop a European one in addition to the national one. However, literature is scarce when it comes to the subject of adopting a European identity by members of generation Y and if available it only presents the situation in particular regions, without portraying an overall picture.

By using the terms “utilitarian” and “emotional” as alternatives to “civic” and “cultural”, Moes’ (2008, p. 17) stresses out the fact that “especially the younger higher educated students feel emotionally attached to Europe”. In giving arguments to support this result, the author argues that it is the effect of young people being born in a more transnational and globalized time, with all its implications like the possibility to travel more and experience different cultures, the openness to connections with other people and the educational opportunities they encounter (Moes, 2008). A recent study (Frunzaru & Corbu, 2011, p. 46) points to a more pragmatic approach and highlights the fact that young people „constantly evaluate how European decisions affect their lives, in an attempt of maximizing their gains and minimizing their losses”. Crețu & Udrea’s (2012) research also reveals that Romanian members of Generation Y frame the concept of European identity mostly in terms of the opportunities that it presents, such as mobility, human rights, education, working abroad etc. The pragmatic vision is also shared by Tsafos (2006), who states that in good times, young people might feel connected on a European level and might share a collective identity, while in bad times they might rely on their national identity and history. We can interpret this idea as an „identity switch” and link it with that of multiple identities in the case of youth (Huyst, 2008): these identities are portrayed as circles – the inner one, represented by the national identity, is the strongest identity form, while the outer circle (European identity), the weakest one. On a similar quest to discover young people’s understanding and patterns of identification with Europe, Grundy & Jamieson (2007) conducted a series of interviews with young people from Edinburgh with regard to European identity and divided British members of Generation Y into “absent-minded citizens” (the majority) and “passionate Europeans” (a few). Nevertheless, the distinction between cultural and civic elements of identity is imprecise. For example, Grundy & Jamieson (2007) found out that participants in their study “tended to mix or conflate ‘cultural’ and ‘civic’ elements in their talk about identity” (Grundy & Jamieson, 2007, p. 675). The same is observed by Huyst (2008), who reveals that the division between civic and cultural symbols is not absolute, and that young people tend to mix them.

Whether the Euro-crisis had an impact on European identity is another issue of importance and the results are surprising in the case of Generation Y. In a research conducted in Great Britain over a three year period (2009-2011), Bruter & Harrison (2012) used a 10 point scale to measure the levels of European identity. The results highlighted the fact that, if for respondents aged 45 and above these levels declined, for the younger part of the population, they increased. We can conclude that European members of Generation Y are more likely than their older counterparts to identify with European values and assume an European identity – even if it is mostly on a pragmatic level.

Although these young people feel somehow connected through a European culture and an European identity, they have some trouble when it comes to defining these terms in a satisfactory manner. For instance, in a study focused on the European Cities of Culture 2000 event, Monica Sassatelli (2009) conducted several interviews with key informants and reviewed data concerning the event, in order to establish the “European identity-building narratives” (Sassatelli, 2009, p. 110). With regard to his sense of Europeanness, a young marketing manager of Italian origin (who lived in Bergen, Norway) stated: “Feeling European, certainly yes. How, I would not know how to explain” (Sassatelli, 2009, p.135). Therefore, it is important to find out how members of Generation Y relate to European identity – and, most importantly, what terms they employ when defining this concept.

5. Research design

This article aims to analyze at an empirical level the concept of European identity as it is presented from a dual perspective in Bruter’s model (2003, 2004), by identifying the civic or cultural components that members of Generation Y employ in order to describe themselves as European citizens. The concept of civic identity is understood as the identification with a certain political system, while cultural identity is depicted as the citizens’ identification with a social group and a common heritage. Following Moes’ distinction (2008), it would mean to observe which utilitarian or emotional aspects matter in regard to their relationship to Europe.

Our research is based on a content analysis on 92 short videos uploaded for the 2013 “Europe Past Forward” Video Challenge, promoted by the European Economic and Social Committee. The contest was described as encouraging “video creativity and the use of social networking, within youth across the 28 member states in Europe” (<http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.video-challenge-2013>). Croatia was also included, as it will be joining the EU in 2013. From October 15th, 2012 to January 20th, 2013, participants were asked to upload a short movie (of maximum 2 minutes) describing their vision on the concept of European citizenship by highlighting the most important elements of Europeanness. Each video entered a public voting session and then a jury decided on the top three finalists.

The grid for our analysis consisted of two sections that correspond to the civic and cultural dimensions of European identity. The categories in our analysis were determined by a combination of both deductive and inductive procedures in order to better present the opinions of the video-makers. When defining civic and cultural identity, we used Bruter’s (2004, 2005) model, stating that the civic dimension refers to identification with the European Union as a political institution (citizenship, symbols of political integration), while the cultural dimension indicates identification with Europe as a cultural community (shared heritage, feeling closer to fellow Europeans than to non-Europeans). Therefore, the civic dimension

addressed issues such as *democracy, mobility, education, security, official symbols of the European Union and economic context*. All these indicators express identification with an institutional system: citizenship, human rights and fundamental freedoms, common institutions, symbols of the EU (flag, anthem, passport, common currency), free movement across borders (Bruter, 2004). Moreover, by analyzing the videos we introduced in this grid another element that is in close connection with the decisions taken by the EU political institutions (*economic context*). The cultural dimension comprised the following indicators – *inter-human relations, European history and traditions, multiculturalism and artistic events and sports*. Some of these indicators are derived from Bruter's (2004, 2005) definition of cultural identity, that includes feeling closer to fellow Europeans, having a common history, sharing values, myths etc. However, the *artistic events and sports* indicator was proposed after a thorough analysis of the videos in the "Europe Past Forward" contest. We focused on identifying which of the above-mentioned dimensions appears in the videos uploaded by participants – and we also took into account whether references to these indicators were of a positive or negative nature. The main research question refers to the way in which members of Generation Y perceive themselves as Europeans.

In our research, the unit of analysis was represented by concepts, meaning that we took into account text, image and sounds grouped together into conceptual clusters. For instance, a conceptual cluster that refers to the idea of democracy (for the civic dimension) comprises elements that mention rights, duties, freedom of expression, equality etc. Indifferent of their nature, all the elements that corresponded to a certain concept were counted as belonging to certain indicator. The choice for this type of analysis was made on grounds that there is a need of a more profound understanding as to how members of Generation Y define themselves as Europeans.

6. Results and discussion

Our research shows that most references in videos are to be found on the civic dimension (202), while the cultural dimension comprises only 91 mentions. However, the most frequently mentioned indicator in the civic dimension (*democracy*) has fewer references than its correspondent in the cultural dimension (*human relations*): 45, respectively 47. As the numbers do not differ to a great extent, we can confirm that young people identify with the European Union both at a civic and a cultural level. Moreover, we found Huyst's (2008, p. 297) conclusion to be true: "the division between civic and cultural is not absolute" – and sometimes these categories overlap, as symbols can play a double role. None of the uploaded videos was solely focused on one of these dimensions – all of them combined references to both civic and cultural indicators.

In regard to the civic dimension, *democracy* is seen as an essential element of young people's European identity, as references to this indicator were found in 45 of the uploaded videos. Freedom is a recurrent theme in the discursive constructions of democracy, appearing in phrases like "Freedom is Europe"; "Freedom of expression"; "Freedom in speech"; "Europe means freedom"; "Freedom brings democracy. Democracy brings peace"; "The Europe I see is fair and free"; "Voice to contribute ideas to improve our lives". Furthermore, we found that a small number of videos (5) refer to democracy from a point of view that concerns rights and duties *attached to EU citizenship*: "Well, for me everyone from Europe is European citizen,

not just if you are from the EU. Personally, I think of myself like European citizen sort of, I don't really believe in nationalism"; "Being European means doing your best as a citizen"; "Who am I without my rights?"; "There's no need of magic to be European citizen. Just use your rights... and be active". Among the above, ten videos mention voting as the most important feature of democracy, while three of them mention the right to participate as a candidate in the elections for the European Parliament ("I know-I am entitled to stand as a candidate in European Parliament elections I know-the Lisbon Treaty allows 1 million EU citizens to call directly on the European Commission to bring forward an initiative"). Additionally, three of the analyzed videos present volunteering as a part of democracy ("The European Voluntary Service can help you help others"). The latter is consistent with the literature on Generation Y behavioral patterns that include getting involved in community activities. Also, when discussing political issues, it seems that at least on a discursive level young people appear to acknowledge their rights and duties, although data (Bruter & Harrison, 2009) reveals they do not actively engage in this sort of activities. Furthermore, it seems that young people's lack of interest in formal politics (Huyst, 2008, Bruter & Harrison, 2009) is also supported by the finding that, when it comes to *European political figures*, there were only two references made to Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, who are among the leaders of the EU – and specifically the elites of two of its founding states. The invisibility and lack of familiar faces of the EU was also cited by Petra Huyst's (2008) research among young Europeans, thus making it harder for them to identify with the EU from a civic point of view. Finally, included within this indicator are three references to *historical events of the EU*: one of them describes the Fall of the Iron Curtain, the first elections for the European Parliament and the creation of the Coal and Steel Community, while the other two bring up the Schengen Agreement, the Lisbon Treaty and the Maastricht Treaty.

Mobility as a defining value of a European identity appears in 43 cases, thus being the second most relevant indicator in this category. Out of the 43 videos, 12 link mobility to opportunities of finding a job, while 30 consider it an opportunity for studying abroad: "I can travel, I can work in Europe"; "Barriers are gone (...) one can just go abroad", "Thanks to the EU I can live and work abroad without any kind of permission"; "Europe offers many opportunities to grow, explore, exchange", "The Europe where boundaries are only in maps". In many cases, *mobility* is linked with another indicator – *education*. Regarding this aspect, European exchange programs are frequently cited (with the exception of 3 videos that do not address them specifically), so it is obvious that Generation Y can comfortably be called "Generation Erasmus", as proposed by Stefan Wolff (Bennhold, 2005). The one video that is concerned with mobility outside the educational area presents the InterRail as a way of traveling through the countries of the EU.

The *official European Union symbols* indicator has 34 references in the analyzed videos. The most prominent in this regard is the flag of the European Union, which appears 25 times, entirely in a visual manner. Following are mentions of the single Euro currency, the passport and the European anthem. The latter appears three times, once textually and twice under the form of a soundtrack. A notable type of identification with Europe that appears 3 times in the analyzed videos is the visual use of the flags of its member states as parts of the whole, thus supporting the Union's motto, "united in diversity".

The *economic context* indicator is mentioned in 32 cases, referring to economic cohesion, innovation, development through business, infrastructure, health insurance card etc. Most references to this indicator are positive, mentioning prosperity: "They told us we couldn't pros-

per, but now we produce more than we consume”. Of course the Euro crisis could not be overlooked by the young Europeans. The fact that Europe is facing an economic crisis appears to be mentioned in 5 videos, but two of them approach the matter in a positive manner, by proposing interstate cooperation as a solution: “Cooperation for saving the Euro-zone”; “The existence of a single international common European market is a good place to do business”. Another video on this matter states “It’s crisis and it’s consumption”, hereby making a positive reference to the American economic model, as consumption is thought to deliver economic growth. All the other videos face the topic of the current crisis negatively. The two most interesting representations in this negative frame are a rhetorical question regarding the exclusion of Greece from the EU (“Is Greece still in the EU?”), respectively a performance in front of an oil well, that points to the scarcity of resources – a, no text, visual representation of the crisis. A somewhat neutral point of view is offered by a young participant whose video affirms that “So much has already been done! But there is still so much to do!”. This mention was counted as positive in nature, as on a visual level the European Union was presented as a superhero. The *economic context* also comprises another important element, the work force situation in Europe. There is a dual approach when it comes to the issue of employment. On the one hand, members of Generation Y mention job opportunities five times in a positive frame, and closely related to the *mobility* indicator as a facilitator. Nevertheless, the issue of unemployment appears several times in the videos, demonstrating its importance when it comes to the young generation of Europeans: “There seems to be a problem in Spain (...) I am unemployed (...) There are employments in Germany”; “I think we are going through a big recession, but I think in 2020 we would have recovered”. These findings confirm the existing literature (Kretsos, 2010, Ostergard & Le Bossé, 2011) that places a great emphasis on the current problem of unemployment when it comes to Generation Y. Another way in which Generation Y members approach the *economic context* is through the European health insurance card that appears in 4 of the 32 videos. A very positive view on the subject is proposed by one of the participants in the video contest: “We are educated to find the key to solve: Healthcare, Human rights, Poverty, Unemployment, Discrimination, Economy, Immigration”.

Education appears 29 times within the analyzed videos as defining Europeanness. It is an important aspect for the young generation, especially due to educational programs developed in the EU (9 references to this item), such as Erasmus, Comenius, Tempus, Grundtvig, Jean Monnet or Leonardo da Vinci. This aspect is mentioned as follows: “Study at university in any EU country”; “Makes it easy to apply for internships, educational programs”. Other elements linked to this indicator comprise learning new languages, building educational edifices, and student facilities. This is how young people in Europe relate to the educational aspect: “Being European means bringing up your children in the best education system”; “Study in Paris, Erasmus exchange in Dublin (...) EU really supports young people”; “We can educate ourselves”.

The *security* indicator comprises 19 references in the videos, as follows: “I feel safer and more secure as part of the EU than I feel as a single nation”; “Be protected by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any other EU country”; “Protect each other”; “Peace is Europe!”; “They told us we couldn’t survive, but now we’ve been alive for over 16 years and we even received our Nobel prize for peace”; “I want to feel safe when I walk home”; “Not to be afraid when they walk on the street”. From the excerpts, it is apparent that this indicator is used by the young people to convey security provided by the EU on both a supra-na-

tional and personal level. Generation Y approaches the security dimension by making unexpected references to the conflicts that existed before the creation of the European Union and the integration of postcommunist countries. Tsafos (2006, p. 181) considers that the younger generation of Europeans “lacks the tragic memory that brought this union together and solidified an entity of different languages, histories, and customs”, but the references in videos partially contradict this theory, showing that members of Generation Y are actually aware of the European struggles and the importance of cooperation and peace.

Within the cultural dimension, as stated above, the *inter-human relations* indicator gathered 47 references, thus becoming the most important in defining Europeanness in the eyes of Generation Y members. This indicator was interpreted as building friendships across borders, feeling part of a community and being tolerant: “We Europeans belong together”; “The Union became a family. Everybody helps each other”; “We all sit at the same table”; “It means feeling like home”.

Multiculturalism amounts to 24 references within the analyzed videos, mostly associated with a mix of cultures and values: “Europe is a meeting of mixed cultures”; “Exchange opinions and get to know other cultures”; “United in diversity”; “In Europe we have 23 different languages”; “Dear Europe, even if we see you in many different ways, we all believe in you!”. It is apparent that members of Generation Y place a lot of emphasis on this indicator of European identity, in agreement with Moes’ (2008) statement that young people are more likely to be emotionally attached to Europe, due to the possibility of traveling and experience exchanges that allow them to understand the diversity of European culture(s).

European history and traditions is mentioned 15 times. Generally, the references for this indicator have positive connotations, such as: “...preserving history”, “I have been surprised by the many traditions of all the countries”, “Memory...cultural heritage”. This indicator took into account the important figures and events in the history of Europe in general, except those referring to the Union *per se*. The latter were included in the civic dimension, under the *democracy* indicator, as they related to the political construction of the European super-state. Therefore, *European history and traditions* comprises references to El Greco or Franz Liszt, while politicians such as Sarkozy and Merkel were counted as references for *democracy*. In the case of *European history and traditions*, one video in particular stresses out the positive aspects of European history in contrast with the degrading present that is not even worth considering: “I can only remember who we have been. Why we don’t go back to the ancient times?” The small number of references for this indicator provides evidence for the fact that young people do not find *history and tradition* of great importance in describing Europeanness.

Artistic events and sports is an item that comprises only 5 references, out of which two represent sports. In the other cases, the focus is on more elitist cultural events, like going to the museum or the opera. The lack of references in this category might imply the fact that members of Generation Y do not consider cultural events as being necessarily an element of connection between them – or a strong indicator of Europeanness. It is also interesting that although these movies were posted by young people, there are no mentions of European music or film festivals, usually described as part of Generation Y’s lifestyle (Sassatelli, 2009).

Our analysis showed that overall, young people perceive Europeanness as positive. The exception is represented by one video which approaches the subject in a negative frame, from the point of view of losing one’s identity: “I am LOST. I have NO identity. Please help me”.

7. Conclusions

From our analysis, we can conclude that members of Generation Y who uploaded videos in the *Europe Past Forward* contest regard European identity as comprising elements from both dimensions: civic and cultural. Although there are 111 more references to the civic aspect, the cultural one cannot be overlooked, as it is important in creating a sense of European-ness. Moreover, if we are to use Moes's (2008) distinction between emotional and utilitarian aspects, we can notice that most references are made to the opportunities the EU holds in accomplishing the interests of young people, but this is not the only aspect these videos highlight. The emotional side of European identity is demonstrated by the large number of references belonging to the *inter-human relations* indicator. Members of Generation Y display their attachment to European values through concepts like "community", "family", "united", "home", "friendship". Some of the contestants in the video challenge go even further stating that "we are one", and expressing their love for the EU: "Dear Europe, we love you!". The utilitarian aspect is predominant in the analyzed videos, thus we can identify a pattern in connection to the way young people express their Europeanness: democratic values, mobility opportunities, education, economic benefits, security. This confirms previous research (Frunzaru & Corbu, 2011) that presents European identity as a cost – benefit pragmatic approach on account of young Europeans.

As our study points out, young Europeans identify with the core values of the European Union that promotes security, economic growth and peace. This implies that they accept these elements as natural to their lives, as they haven't experienced the hard times the older generations had to surpass, in agreement with Tsafos's (2006) theory. On the other hand, a certain degree of individualism is also revealed by this research, as the identification with these values is done on a utilitarian level. Generation Y members use first person pronouns to express their appreciation of these values as factors that enable them to reach their personal goals, for instance: "I want to feel safe when I walk home", "Who am I without my rights?". Moreover, the accent on mobility and educational programs is also an indicator of utilitarianism in the case of Generation Y. As Twenge (2009) suggested, this generation can be labeled the "Me Generation", due to its individualistic traits. Our research also confirms this fact, as young people place a lot of importance on how these elements help them progress on a professional and personal level. This is also emphasized by the fact that European exchange programs are cited in more than 60 videos, which reinforces the "Erasmus generation" (Bennhold, 2005, Lominé, 2009) title that was ascribed to the European youth.

Indeed, as Sutherland and Thompson (2003) present, young people's interaction with technology and their general openness to the world makes them more aware and accepting of other cultures and customs. Therefore, the *multiculturalism* indicator in our research is well represented among Generation Y members, who comfortably live in a mix of cultures and speak more than one language.

When it comes to the subject of the economic crisis, young Europeans do not highlight it in the analyzed videos as an element that disturbs their sense of European-ness. Although there are a few references to this aspect, Kretsos' (2010) view on the subject – that Generation Y members could be a "Precarious Generation" – is not supported by our findings. There are, of course, a few mentions of insecurity in terms of employment and the lack of resources in some of the EU member states, but they are scarce.

Another important topic highlighted by this research is that of multiple identities. It is apparent that some members of Generation Y describe themselves firstly (or only) as Europeans: “I think that the most important is the awareness of being a member of the EU and your own country (...)”. Furthermore, some of the young people in this study manifested strong feelings towards Europeaness, and even came to reject the idea of a national identity: “I’m European”; “Well, for me everyone from Europe is European citizen, not just if you are from the EU. Personally, I think of myself like European citizen sort of, I don’t really believe in nationalism”. It is questionable if in the case of young people European identity actually constitutes the outer circle of identification (Lutz, Kritzingner & Skirbekk, 2006, Huyst, 2008) and whether they think of their identity in layers or whether the national and European identities overlap to the point where the distinction between them cannot be made – and it is not even intended.

References

1. Bauman, Z. (2001). Identity in the globalizing world. *Social Anthropology*. Vol. 9, No. 2, pp.121-129.
2. Bennhold, K. (2005). Quietly Sprouting: A European Identity. *New York Times*. Retrieved May 2013, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/26/world/europe/26iht-enlarge2.html?pagewanted=all>
3. Bruter, M. (2003). On What Citizens Mean by Feeling “European”: Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderless-ness. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 30 (1). pp. 21-39.
4. Bruter, M. (2004). Civic and Cultural Components of a European Identity: A Pilot Model of Measurement of Citizens’ levels of European identity. In R. Herrmann, T. Risse and M. Brewer (Eds.), *Transnational identities. Becoming European in the EU*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
5. Bruter, M. (2005). *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
6. Bruter, M., Harrison, D. (2009). *The Future of Our Democracies. Young Party Members in Europe*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
7. Bruter, M., Harrison, S. (2012). *How European Do You Feel? The Psychology of European Identity*. Retrieved April 2013, from <http://www.lansons.com/pdfs/eu-identity-brochure.pdf>.
8. Crețu, F., Udrea, G. (2012). European Identity, Media and Otherness: Empirical Findings From a Framing Perspective. *Review Of The Air Force Academy*, Vol. 20, No. 1.
9. Duczkowska-Piasecka, M., Mazurkiewicz, K. (2012). The significance of developing European identity – the analysis of Polish students. *European Integration Studies*. No. 6.
10. Eder, K. (2009). A theory of collective identity. Making sense of the debate on a European Identity. *European Journal of Social Theory*. 12(4):427-447.
11. Flanagan, C., Jonsson, B., Botcheva, L., Csapo, B., Bowes, J., Macek, P., Averina, I., Sheblanova, E. (2006). Adolescents and the “Social Contract”: Developmental Roots of Citizenship in Seven Countries. In M. Yates, J. Youniss (Eds.), *Roots of Civic Identity. International Perspectives on Community Service and Activism in Youth* (pp. 135 -156) . New York: Cambridge University Press.
12. Frunzaru, V., Corbu, N. (2011). In Search of a European Identity: An Instrumental Approach. *Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations*. Vol. 13, No. 4 (24).
13. Goerres, A. (2010). *Being Less Active and Outnumbered? The Political Participation and Relative Pressure Potential of Young People in Europe*. In: J. C. Tremmel (Ed.) *A Young Generation Under Pressure? The Financial Situation and the “Rush Hour” of the Cohorts 1970-1985 in a Generational Comparison* (pp. 207-225). London: Springer.
14. Greenberg, E., Weber, K. (2008). *Generation We. How Millennial Youth Are Taking Over America And Changing Our World Forever*. Emeryville: Pachatusan.

15. Grundy, S., Jamieson, L. (2007). European Identities: From Absent-Minded Citizens to Passionate Europeans. *Sociology*. Vol. 41, No. 4.
16. Hogg, M. A., Reid, S. A. (2006). Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Communication of Group Norms. *Communication Theory*. 16, pp.7-30.
17. Huntley, R. (2006). *The World According to Y: Inside the New Adult Generation*. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin.
18. Huyst, P. (2008). "We have made Europe, now we have to make Europeans": Researching European Identity among Flemish Youths. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. Vol. 4, No. 4.
19. Inthorn, S. (2006). What Does It Mean to Be an EU Citizen? How News Media Construct Civic and Cultural Concepts of Europe. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*. Vol. 3(3):71-90.
20. Kamphausen, G. (2006). European Integration and European Identity: Towards a Politics of Difference?. *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*. 1, pp.24-31.
21. Karolewski, P., Kaina, V. (2012). *Civic Resources and the Future of The European Union*. New York: Routledge Advanced Politics.
22. Kretsos, L. (2010). The persistent Pandemic of Precariousness: Young People at Work. In Tremmel, J. C. (Ed.) *A Young Generation Under Pressure? The Financial Situation and the "Rush Hour" of the Cohorts 1970-1985 in a Generational Comparison* (pp. 3-23). London: Springer.
23. Lacroix, J. (2002). For a European Constitutional Patriotism. *Political Studies*. Vol 50, 944-958.
24. Laffan, B. (2004). The European Union and its Institutions as "identity builders". In R. Herrmann, T. Risse and M. Brewer (Eds.). *Transnational identities. Becoming European in the EU*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
25. Leccardi, C. (2006). Facing Uncertainty. Temporality and Biographies in the New Century. In Leccardi, C., Ruspini, E. (Eds.). *A New Youth? Young People, Generations and Family Life* (pp 15 -40). Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
26. Lewis, J., Inthorn, S., Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2005). *Citizens or Consumers? What the Media Tell Us about Political Participation*. Berkshire: Open University Press.
27. Lominé, L. L. (2009). Academic Mobility Within Contemporary Europe: ERASMUS, the Bologna Process, and the Creation of a European Higher Education Area. In Femi James Kolapo (ed.). *Immigrant Academics and Cultural Challenges in Global Environment*. New York: Cambria Press.
28. Lutz, W., Kritzing, S., Skirbekk, V. (2006). The Demography of Growing European Identity, *Science*, Vol. 314, No. 5798, p. 425.
29. Mayer, F. C., Palmowski J. (2004). European Identities and the EU – The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe. *JCMS*. Volume 42, Number 3, pp. 573-98.
30. Moes, J. (2008). *European Identity Compared. A Mixed Methods Approach*. Retrieved February 2013, from <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-riga/virtualpaperroom/032.pdf>.
31. Ostergren, R. C., Le Bossé, M. L. (2011). *The Europeans: A Geography of People, Culture, and Environment*. New York: The Guilford Press.
32. Risse, T., Grabowsky K. J. (2008). European identity formation in the public sphere and in foreign policy. *RECON Online Working Paper*.
33. Roberts, K. (2006). *Young People and Family Life in Eastern Europe*. In: Leccardi, C., Ruspini, E. (Eds.) *A New Youth? Young People, Generations and Family Life* (pp. 203- 223). Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
34. Rosen, L. D. (2007). *Me, MySpace and I: Parenting the Net Generation*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
35. Sassatelli, M. (2009). *Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
36. Strath, B. (2006). Future of Europe. *Journal of Language and Politics*. Vol. 5:3, pp. 427-448.
37. Sutherland, A., Thompson, B. (2003). *Kidfluence. The Marketer's Guide to Understanding and Reaching Generation Y – Kids, Tweens and Teens*. New York: McGraw Hill.
38. Tajfel, H. (1982). *Social identity and intergroup relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

39. Tapscott, D. (2009). *Grown Up Digital. How The Net Generation is Changing Your World*, New York: McGraw Hill.
40. Tekin, B. Ç. (2010). *Representations and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the EU context*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
41. Tremmel, J. C., Wegner, P. (2010). German Bundestag Survey on Intergenerational Justice in the Labour Market. In Tremmel, J. C. (Ed.). *A Young Generation Under Pressure? The Financial Situation and the "Rush Hour" of the Cohorts 1970-1985 in a Generational Comparison* (pp. 77 – 109). London: Springer.
42. Tsafos, N. E. (2006). Growing Up A European? *SAIS Review*. Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 181.
43. Turner, J. C, Oakes, P. J, Haslam, S. A, McGarty, C. (1994). Self and Collective: Cognition and Self Context. *PSPB*. Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 454-463.
44. Twenge, J. M. (2009). Generational Changes And Their Impact In The Classroom: Teaching Generation Me. *Medical Education*. Vol. 43, pp. 398 – 405.
45. Udrea, G., Corbu, N. (2010). The Building of a European Identity and Its Challenges. *Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations*. Vol.12, No.3.
46. Wodak, R. (2009). *The discourse of politics in action. Politics as usual*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
47. Youniss, J., Yates, M. (2006). *Introduction: International Perspectives on the Roots of Civic Identity*. In M. Yates, J. Youniss (Eds.). *Roots of Civic Identity. International Perspectives on Community Service and Activism in Youth* (pp. 1 -16). New York: Cambridge University Press.
48. Zemke, R., Raines, C., Filipczak, B. (2000). *Generations At Work. Managing The Clash of Veterans, Boomers, Xers, and Nexters in Your Workplace*. New York: Amacom.

Book review

Elena NEGREA-BUSUIOC*

Review of *The Walk of Shame* edited by Mira Moshe and Nicoleta Corbu. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2013, 265 pages

The psychological and sociological dimensions of shame have been largely discussed in the literature (see Kaufman, 1986; Tangney et al., 1996; Simmel, 1904/1957; Goffman, 1956) and scholarly reflection in the respective fields has shown that shame is one of the emotions that are essentially involved in the structure and transformation of individuals and societies as a whole. Mira Moshe and Nicoleta Corbu's collection contains a wide range of approaches to shame and shameful exposures of both private and public figures across different cultures. While admitting the importance of psychological and sociological approaches to shame as both a self-conscious and a social emotion, the editors recognize the under-exploited research potential of shame-related social behaviours and of the strategies of coping with shame. From the very beginning, Moshe and Corbu announce that the book tackles "the multi-cultural manipulation of shame, as well as the cynical manner in which it is exploited in various cultures" (p. vii). Furthermore, the book makes an admirable effort to present "the <<new>> walk of shame as performed by individuals who become famous by means of a shameless exposure of their past, their conduct and their behavior" (p. vii). The chapters of the book contain insightful analyses of situations in which politicians, politicians' wives, TV stars, sportswomen and private individuals do the walk of shame. Another merit of the book consists of discussions of the role played by the media in organising and covering the walk of shame and, even more interestingly, in assisting people change the disgraceful walk of shame into a more glorifying walk of fame. Media framing of shame (such as the transformation of the walk of shame into a walk of fame) is one of the (apparently) successful strategies that usually, but not exclusively, celebrities and public figures use to cope with shame. This book is a collection of interesting investigations of walks of shame as they have been framed by the media in various countries across the globe.

The book is organised in four sections, each section containing several chapters. The first section is dedicated to the examination of some cases with great potential of shifting shame into pride. Three out of the four chapters in this section focus on politics-related shameful situations, and one chapter discusses a strategy to achieve fame frequently adopted among young people. Moshe researches here young people's willingness to reveal embarrassing private information in order to imitate celebrities' behaviour and to achieve fame. In the first chapter of the section, Corbu and Moshe analyse the huge potential of media and of campaign strategists to transform a politician's walk of shame into a stride of pride. This happened in the 2009 Romanian presidential campaign when a candidate's walk of shame had been used to gain political capital by his campaign strategists. As the authors conclude, doing the walk of shame

* College of Communication and Public Relations, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania, elena.negrea@comunicare.ro

during a presidential campaign “does not necessarily discredit the candidate” (p.17); this ritual may actually help create an “underdog” effect that help transform the shameful exposure into an unfair attack to which the candidate is a victim. Nastasia and Nastasia shed light upon a classical walk of shame done by a US politician’s wife as a result of the media exposure of that fact that her husband cheated on her. The study examines the consequences that her husband’s sex scandal has had on the wife’s “simplified representation” (p.69), in which she was either idealized or demonized.

The second section of the book comprises five chapters dedicated to the investigation of the causes and results of the walk of shame. Moshe analyses the impact of shameful exposures in the Israeli entertainment industry. The study shows that “more female celebs walk the walk of shame than male celebs” (p. 87). Another study in this section offers an explanation for the shame of both rapists and their victims in the context of the sexual violence in South Africa. Womersley discusses President Zuma’s rape trial and the way in which he “arguably managed to turn this <<walk of shame>> into a <<walk of fame>>” (p. 107), while, at the same time, his victim has gained fame and became a symbol of all abused women in South Africa. Prasad’s contribution to the book is an interesting account of the walk of shame as a social constraint that ordinary and public (celebrities) Indian women must fulfil, and the way in which media frame this in accordance with the requirements of a male-dominated society. The author shows that, in India, “the walk of shame is an integral part of the violence against women leading to their disgrace, resulting in regulation or negating their degrees of freedom. While women are rendered voiceless and bear the burden of the walk of shame, men seem to be under no such social constraints” (p. 113).

Section three includes two chapters focusing on theoretical aspects of shame and other related concepts – guilt, embarrassment and pride. Ivan proposes an informed overview of the approaches to shame in developmental psychology and sociology. The author highlights the shortcomings of both perspectives (e.g. the lack of social context in most psychological research on shame and the lack of conceptual clarity in sociological studies of shame) and advocates for a more systematic study of shame in relation to guilt, embarrassment, humiliation and pride. She also underscores the research potential of studying shame and pride as paired emotions and its implications on the shift from shame to fame as a strategy to cope with the negative emotion.

The fourth section provides two studies of the way in which the walk of shame is framed in two distinctive contexts: sports competitions and social representation of the sexualised body of African-American women. In her discursive analysis of sports competitions, Dumitriu examines the construction and evolution of (collective) shame of the Romania’s handball team’s disappointing performance to the 2011 World Championship, as it was portrayed by the media. By exploiting the difference between expected and actual performance of athletes to their own advantages, media often contribute to their public humiliation or glorification. If they fail to live up to expected performances, famous sports stars are constrained by the journalists to do the walk of shame, irrespective of the mitigating circumstances of the competition in which such less-than-expected results have been obtained. Finally the last chapter of the section and of the book investigates the concept of “walk of shame” in its original context, i.e. the US colleges, and in close relation to the reputation that the walker (usually a woman) seeks to preserve (p. 238). In analysing the social representations of the sexualised black body, Rowinski suggests that the “walk of shame can be seen as another tool in the repertoire of controlling sexuality” (p. 246).

Generally, the book leaves the impression that the walk of shame is mainly a social phenomenon and that its consequences for the individual who is doing the walk are closely related to his or her capacity to cope with the public exposure of shameful events to which she or he has participated. In the case of public figures, the walk of shame is highly influenced (if not controlled) by the media and by other external factors interested in the walker and/or in the situation which has generated the walk. As Moshe and Corbu point out in their introduction, “no longer a shameful crawl though back alleys, today’s <<walk>> is a well-planned, carefully-timed and rehearsed parade along the Main Street of the popular media” (p. viii).

The main strength of the book is that it contains an original, comprehensive and thorough analysis of one of the strategies of coping with shame, namely the walk of shame. The book includes insightful investigations of the walk of shame across cultures and in relation to a wide range of shameful disclosures: from private people’s shameful events, to sex-scandals involving politicians, to rape and terrorist attacks, to sports failures and celebrities accounts of shameful situations. However, the strength of the book may also be its greatest downfall. In the attempt to cover many and diverse walk of shame situations, a thorough delimitation of theoretical perspectives surrounding the concept of walk of shame (and shame, for that matter) is overlooked. In addition, this may have led to a less than ideal organisation of the book and to a lack of a clear theoretical approach which holds together the chapters. Nevertheless, the book is an important contribution to understanding of the phenomenon of the walk of shame in a variety of social and cultural contexts.

References

1. Goffman, E. (1956). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Center.
2. Kaufman, G. (1986). *The Psychology of Shame*. Springer Publishing Company.
3. Simmel, G. (1904/1957). Fashion. *International Quarterly* X, pp. 130-55. (Reprinted in the *American Journal of Sociology* 62, pp. 541-59.)
4. Tangney, J. P., Miller, R.S., Flicker, R. & Barlow, D. S. (1996). Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Vol.70, No. 6, pp. 1256-1269.

Call for papers

Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations
www.journalofcommunication.ro

The *Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations* (RJCPR) is now seeking manuscripts for its upcoming issues. We welcome scholarly contributions from the broad field of communication studies, from public relations research, as well as from related areas. RJCPR also accepts relevant contributions for its permanent book review section.

Prospective authors should submit original papers which meet the customary academic standards in the social sciences. These materials should be methodologically sound, thoroughly argued, and well crafted. They must not have been published elsewhere, or be currently under review for any other publication.

All manuscripts are subject to a blind review process before publication. The author(s) name(s) should not appear on any page except the title page of the submitted paper, and electronic identification data should be removed before submission.

Important Dates:

The Journal is issued three times per year, in April, July, and December. Here are the submission deadlines:

- April issue: March 1;
- July issue: May 1;
- December issue: October 1.

Submission

Submissions must follow the Guidelines for Authors, available on the Journal's website (www.journalofcommunication.ro/guidelines). For further inquiries, please contact the editor, dr. Elena Negrea, elena.negrea@comunicare.ro

More information on the *Journal of Communication and Public Relations* can be found at www.journalofcommunication.ro

The Internet, the crisis of the written press and why should we care

European IPTV and the digital divide

Different types of conflict in the news and their impact on political trust: the cumulated effect of incivility and intrusiveness